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 There is a popular lay-belief that consumers always strive to repair their negative mood. 
However, one can think of contrary instances where people seek out melancholic music when 
they feel sad, or choose to remain miserable when something frustrates them. My dissertation 
proposes that people vary considerably in the degree to which they need to feel better when they 
experience negative feelings. Specifically, my dissertation advances current understanding of 
why certain individuals do not engage in mood repair. It also allows us to decipher when people 
would form judgments and decisions in a mood-congruent versus mood-incongruent manner, 
thereby accounting for the lack of robustness of mood repair effects. To this end, I advance a 
construct called the “Need to Feel Better” (NFB), and propose four distinct facets of NFB that 
individuals differ on: 1) behavioral tendency to repair bad moods, 2) aversion to negative 
feelings, 3) pleasure derived from negative feelings, and 4) tendency to reflect on negative 
feelings. I also propose a scale that measures this construct and the four facets it encompasses. 
My dissertation shows that NFB is associated with stronger preference for common mood repair 
activities such as leisure shopping and exercise. It is also associated with certain demographics 
(e.g., age and gender), personality traits (e.g., extraversion and agreeableness), and self-
regulation constructs (e.g., promotion-focus). NFB also predicts people’s tendency to engage in 
mood repair when they experience negative moods and their attitudes towards mood lifting 
appeals. From a managerial standpoint, this work provides insights for the marketing of “feel-
good” products (e.g., aromatherapy and vacation packages) and the use of mood repair appeals 
 
 
(e.g., Volkswagen’s “Get Happy” Super Bowl commercial and the “Look Good Feel Better” 
campaign for women with cancer by the cosmetics industry).   
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 In modern societies, consumption in one form or another is frequently regarded as a 
major mood-regulatory device (Luomala and Laaksonen 1999). The term “retail therapy” was 
first introduced in the Chicago Tribune on Christmas Eve in 1986. In that article, it was reported 
that “We've become a nation measuring out our lives in shopping bags and nursing our psychic 
ills through retail therapy.” Since then, the popular lay belief about shopping as a way to chase 
the blues away has been commonly transmitted through films, TV programs, and social media. 
The Internet is replete with quotes like “Shopping is cheaper than a psychiatrist (Tammy Faye 
Bakker).” and “I love shopping. There is a little bit of magic found in buying something new. It 
is instant gratification, a quick fix (Rebecca Bloom).” In advertising and promotional campaigns, 
products and services are often marketed as ways to make consumers “feel better” if they are 
feeling “down” (e.g., flowers, spas, movies, alcohol, etc.). Take for instance Edible 
Arrangements, a business that sells fresh fruit baskets with designs inspired by floral bouquets. 
In one of their advertisement campaigns, they promote a new product offering called the “Cheer 
me up bouquet,” and tout how “You can always brighten someone’s day with our new cheer me 
up bouquet!” In a television commercial, Nature’s Lab, a company that sells health supplements, 
asks consumers if they are feeling blue and suggest that consumers might be taking the wrong 
vitamins. They then go on to promote the benefits of their vitamin products, and show how 
consuming the product restores a cartoon character’s face from blue to his original color. The 
advertisement then ends with the tagline: “Don’t take our word for it, feel it for yourself.” 
 It is widely assumed that all consumers have a need to repair their moods and strive to 
feel better when they experience unpleasant emotions. Recent research in psychology and 
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marketing, however, has begun to cast doubt on this universal tendency for people to engage in 
mood repair activities that is based on the hedonic principle. In particular, individuals sometimes 
choose to remain in a negative state, or even bring on unpleasant emotions rather than regulate 
their mood upwards (e.g., Cohen and Andrade 2004; Tamir 2009). In my dissertation, I propose 
that this need to mood repair is far from universal—consumers vary considerably in the degree to 
which they need to feel better when they are down. Initial findings from lab experiments suggest 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in people’s desire to engage in mood repair and that mood 
repair effects are more likely to occur under certain circumstances. These findings spurred me to 
develop a new construct called the “Need to Feel Better” (NFB) and create a scale that measures 
this construct. Through an extensive process of scale development, I identified four distinct 
aspects of NFB on which consumers vary in: 1) behavioral tendency to repair bad moods, 2) 
aversion to negative feelings, 3) pleasure derived from negative feelings, and 4) tendency to 
reflect on negative feelings.  
 From a conceptual standpoint, differentiating individuals on their NFB is important. It 
enhances our understanding of why certain individuals choose to remain in their negative mood 
and not do anything to improve it. It also allows us to decipher when people would form 
judgments and decisions in a mood-congruent versus mood-incongruent way (Andrade and 
Cohen 2004). In addition, distinguishing between people with high NFB and low NFB may help 
account for the lack of robustness in mood repair effects that has been documented in the mood 
literature. From a marketing standpoint, this has implications for the positioning of feeling-based 
appeals in product advertising and promotions. It also allows us to identify consumers who are 
more likely to engage in mood repair activities as well as conditions that would motivate those 
with low NFB to engage in these activities. From a consumer welfare standpoint, this research 
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has implications for consumer satisfaction with product consumption, and more broadly, 
consumer psychological wellbeing. 
 This dissertation proceeds as follows: first the extant literature on mood regulation is 
reviewed, with an emphasis on why the development of the NFB construct provides a unique 
research opportunity. From this introduction, I describe the process of developing and validating 
the NFB scale. After describing these results, I present several studies that I conducted to test the 
validity of the construct. In these studies, I tested whether NFB predicts the likelihood of 
individuals engaging in mood repair behaviors when they experience negative versus neutral 
mood. Specifically, I examined whether individuals with high NFB would be more likely to 
expose themselves to positive-sounding media options (e.g., happy music or news articles; 
Chapters 5 and 6), indulge in more snacks (Chapter 8), or recall more pleasant memories from 
the past (Chapter 10). In addition, I examined whether NFB predicts the effectiveness of 
advertising appeals that focus on happiness (Chapter 7) and people’s tendency to engage in 
unplanned purchasing behavior (Chapter 9). Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the 
obtained findings and a discussion of the contributions of the NFB scale to the literature and 






2.1. Mood Repair Literature 
 Moods are defined as “pervasive, global, generalized affective components or states” 
(Isen 1984, 85). They are typically considered as diffuse feeling states that lack source 
identification (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade 2006), and are often differentiated from emotions 
which tend to have “a distinctive cause and an object of reference” (Larsen 2000, 130). Mood 
repair includes any attempts that individuals make to alleviate negative moods (Morris and 
Reilly 1987). Such activities are often driven by a hedonic motive to feel better, although there 
are situations where individuals may strive to terminate negative moods to pursue other goals 
such as adherence to social norms (Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 1996; Hochschild 1979).  
 Studies have shown that people employ a wide variety of strategies to repair their 
negative mood (e.g., Parkinson and Totterdell 1999; Thayer, Newman and McClain 1994). To 
regulate bad mood, individuals may use cognitive strategies such as retrieving pleasant memories 
to counteract negative affect (Parott and Sabini 1990; Rusting and DeHart 2000). In a field study 
by Parott and Sabini (1990), for example, undergraduate students who did poorer than expected 
on a graded midterm exam were more likely to recall positive memories of their high school 
years compared to those who did equally well or better than expected on the exam. According to 
Isen (1985, 1987), people try to maintain positive mood states by thinking of pleasant events and 
associations, but eliminate negative mood states by distracting themselves from unpleasant 
events and associations. To repair negative mood, people may also adopt behavioral strategies 
such as helping others (Baumann, Cialdini, and Kenrick 1981; Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent 
1973). Across multiple studies, subjects induced with bad mood, relative to those in the control 
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conditions, were more likely to help others, only in the absence of alternative hedonic benefits 
(Baumann et al. 1981; Cialdini et al. 1973) and when they believed that helping could improve 
their mood (Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini 1984). 
 Individuals may additionally engage in consumption-related activities to improve their 
mood. Based on qualitative data, Kacen (1994) identified a broad set of strategies that people 
adopt to manage negative feelings. In particular, she explored individuals’ phenomenological 
experiences of negative moods and identified consumer behaviors (i.e., acquisition, consumption 
and disposition of goods and services) that they employed to improve their moods. Depth 
interviews with 12 undergraduate informants revealed two classes of strategies that people may 
adopt to manage negative feelings after an initial phase of self reflection to understand these 
feelings: 1) escape activities (e.g., reading or working out in the gym) that allow one to turn their 
attention away from the source of negative affect; 2) control behaviors (e.g., driving or cleaning) 
that provide one with a sense of mastery over the physical environment. Additionally, people’s 
choices of activities depend on the nature of the negative mood. Whereas arousing negative 
affective states like frustration may lead to physical activities (e.g., exercising) that enable one to 
release the excess arousal, energy-consuming states like depressive mood may lead one to 
engage in more sedentary activities (e.g., watching television). 
 Other researchers have also found that people repair their negative moods by seeking 
immediate gratification like eating fattening snacks (Tice, Bratslavasky, and Baumeister 2001), 
self-gifting (Luomala and Laaksonen 1997; Mick and Demoss 1990), and impulse buying (Rook 
and Gardner 1993). Tice and colleagues induced participants with either negative or positive 
mood. After the mood manipulation, they were told while waiting to participate in another study 
to take part in an unrelated pilot study that examined individual differences in taste perception. 
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They were instructed to taste various kinds of foods and fill out taste questionnaires. Participants 
were additionally instructed to eat as much food as they needed to make a proper taste 
evaluation. Unbeknownst to these participants, the researchers were really interested in the 
amount of food they had consumed during the taste test. Consistent with mood repair theory, 
those who were induced with negative mood ate more than those induced with positive mood. 
Importantly, participants seemed to be aware of their own mood repair behavior. In Tice et al.’s 
study, one participant said, “I felt better after eating. I didn’t feel as sad. The food helped me to 
distance myself from the bad feeling I had from the story” (Tice and Bratslavsky 2000, 154). 
Similarly, in the study by Rook and Gardner, over a third of the participants sampled mentioned 
that they had previously made impulse purchases when they experienced negative mood, and 
reported doing so in the hope of alleviating the unpleasant mood state. Taken together, this body 
of research serves as evidence that consumers may deliberately not exert self-regulation in a 
particular domain (e.g., spending, eating) in order to reach the goal of mood regulation. They 
may come to a “conscious decision to permit a small lapse in self-control to achieve the greater 
good of balancing mood state” (Faber and Vohs 2011, 540).  
 Finally, there is a significant body of research showing that people use entertainment 
choices to manage their moods (see Zillman 1988). In one clever study by Meadowcroft and 
Zillmann (1987), female undergraduates were given a list of familiar prime time television 
programs and asked to choose an evening’s worth of programs that they would like to watch that 
night. Additionally, they reported the onset of their last and next-to-last menstrual period. Results 
showed that premenstrual and menstrual women (who were arguably more depressed and hence 
should experience the greatest need to lift their mood) expressed more desire for comedies 
compared to other women in the other stages of the menstrual cycle. In these studies, negative 
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mood manipulations tended to increase individuals’ selection of entertainment with high hedonic 
content (e.g., comedies and energetic-joyful music; Knobloch and Zillmann 2002).  
 Despite the overwhelming evidence that people engage in mood repair when they are 
induced with negative mood, some inconsistencies have been documented in the literature. For 
instance, Cunningham (1988) found that negative mood did not increase people’s interest in 
prosocial behavior or self-gratification. In fact, negative mood reduced interest in social and 
leisure activities, and was associated with solitary activities like sitting and thinking. Nabi, 
Finnerty, Domschke, and Hull (2006) conducted a study on television programming to explore 
how negative affect from regretted experiences influences viewers’ preference for regret-relevant 
shows. In their study, they showed that participants experiencing regret (e.g., they were 
unfaithful in their romantic relationships and felt regret about cheating their partner) were more 
likely than other participants to prefer watching programs that elicited similar feelings. Gibson, 
Aust, and Zillman (2000) investigated high school students’ selection of music under conditions 
of unrestricted choice, and found that both male and female adolescents sought out music 
compatible to their own mood, whether negative or positive. Specifically, those who were feeling 
melancholy reported greater preference for sad music that mourns sorrowful moments. Also 
investigating people’s tendency to manage their mood via music selection, Chen, Zhou and 
Bryant (2007) randomly assigned participants to a sad or neutral mood induction and asked them 
to select music from a sample of popular songs that they would listen to for eight minutes in a 
purportedly unrelated study. They found that participants in the neutral mood condition spent 
significantly longer time listening to joyful songs than participants in the sad mood condition. 
Interestingly, they also discovered an interaction effect between mood condition and time such 
that this difference was attenuated over the eight minutes. Negative mood participants exposed 
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themselves to as much joyful music as neutral mood participants by the end of the eight minutes. 
The authors suggested that these results demonstrated the existence of an affective inertia, in 
which the bad mood experienced by the participants overwhelmed and interfered with their 
ability to undertake behavioral attempts to repair their mood. These authors also found trait-
ruminative tendency to deter mood repair attempts. In particular, compared to non-habitual 
ruminators, habitual ruminators devoted significantly less of their time to joyful music in the sad 
than in the neutral mood condition. In fact, habitual ruminators preferred sad music over 
alternative pieces of music across the eight-minute period. This finding provides evidence that 
individual differences could moderate people’s engagement in mood repair when they 
experience negative mood. In the next section, I review literature that examines moderators of 
mood repair effects.  
2.2. Moderators of Mood Repair   
 Recent work by Andrade (2005) suggests that for mood repair effects to occur individuals 
must first view mood as dynamic. Specifically, they must be able to perceive a discrepancy 
between feelings at two points in time – feelings currently experienced and feelings that could 
arise as a result of some behavioral activity. More importantly, individuals must intuitively 
believe that the activity will be effective in helping them regulate their mood toward the desired 
state. Andrade demonstrated that the salience of the mood-changing properties of certain 
behaviors influences people’s tendency to mood repair using these behaviors. Among 
participants induced with negative mood, tendency to view eating chocolate as mood lifting was 
associated with greater willingness to taste a new chocolate product. In another study, 
participants in a negative mood who were told that they would need to answer a survey that takes 
12 minutes to complete (a mood threatening property) in order to receive a free beverage sample 
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were less willing to try the beverage than those who were told that the survey takes 3 minutes to 
complete (less mood threatening).  
Although not tested directly in his paper, Andrade (2005) proposed two additional 
conditions for mood repair to take place. First, people will pursue activities with a short term 
hedonistic goal (i.e., those that will evoke positive feelings or pleasure (e.g., shopping)) only in 
the absence of competing goals in the environment (e.g., saving), a principle he defines as 
conditional hedonism. Second mood repair would be more likely when affective signals are 
stronger and more accessible because this would make the projected discrepancy as well as the 
appropriateness of the current state more salient. Andrade also identified diagnosticity of the 
current affective state (i.e., the perceived informational value of the current state with respect to 
the behavior under consideration) as playing an important role in mood regulation. Nonetheless, 
it is less clear how diagnosticity would influence mood repair. For example, people may restrain 
from a particular regulating activity (e.g., spending on a new dress) when they realize the 
underlying reason for their negative mood, or they could be more motivated to do so as a form of 
self-reward.   
 Other researchers have also identified boundary conditions for mood repair effects. 
Labroo and Mukhopadhyay (2009) showed that tendency to engage in mood repair depends on 
one’s lay beliefs about emotion transience. Individuals who believed that emotion is fleeting 
were less likely to repair their mood because they inferred that actions to feel better were 
unnecessary as negative feelings would pass on their own. In contrast, those who believed that 
emotion is lasting were more likely to repair their mood because they inferred that the negative 
feelings would persist unless they took actions to repair them. There is also research showing 
that individuals with low self esteem (Heimpel, Wood, Marshall and Brown 2002; Smith and 
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Petty 1995) and dysphoria (Joomann and Siemer 2004) are less motivated to repair their negative 
moods. Various researchers suggest that such individuals may be more accustomed, and hence 
more accepting, toward their negative moods (Heimpel et al. 2002), feel that they do not deserve 
to feel better (Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, and Whittington 2009), or have lower expectations that 
mood repair activities will effectively lift their moods (Smith and Petty 1995).  
 In a separate line of work, I have identified certain circumstances that may facilitate 
people’s choices of products which would help to repair their mood. Based on the Generalized 
Affect-as-Information Model of judgment (GAIM; Pham 2009), I argue that the format in which 
mood repair alternatives are presented influences people’s choices of such alternatives because 
various formats elicit different types of private questioning (principle of query dependence). In 
particular, individuals in a bad mood facing a choice between several alternatives (versus a 
single alternative at a time) would be more likely to ask themselves “Which option would make 
me feel better?” and be less likely to ask themselves “How do I feel about each option?” 
Compared to the latter questioning, the former questioning makes it more conducive for 
individuals to differentiate between various alternatives and form a decision when alternatives 
are presented in a comparative manner. Hence, I hypothesized that individuals doing a 
comparative task would be more likely to engage in mood regulation than those presented with 
the same options separately.  
To test this hypothesis, participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to 
participate in a 2 (response mode: comparative vs. non-comparative) × 2 (mood manipulation: 
negative vs. neutral) × 2 (product category: mood relevant vs. mood non-relevant) mixed-
subjects design experiment, with product category as the within-subjects factor. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subject conditions. All participants were 
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informed that they would be performing two independent studies that were combined for 
convenience. Study 1, which was in fact the mood manipulation, was framed as a study on text 
comprehension that was investigating how presentation of a case study influences one’s 
understanding of it. Participants were told to read one version of the case study, describe its 
content in their own words, and rate their comprehension of the study. They received one of two 
stories describing events that happened to a young woman who was a promising artist (adapted 
from Erber 1991). The story designed to induce negative mood described how the artist was 
overcome by a rare, disabling disease (rheumatoid arthritis) at the end of her freshman year in 
college, while the neutral mood story described how she was deciding which college to attend.  
Participants then proceeded to study 2, which was purportedly a pretest to develop 
suitable stimuli for another experiment. Participants assigned to the comparative conditions were 
presented first with a choice between a gel-ink or ballpoint pen, followed by a choice between 
watching an episode of Saturday Night Live, an live television sketch comedy and variety show, 
or watching an episode of Anderson Cooper 360°, a news program that covers current and 
critical news issues produced by CNN. For each pair of choices, they were instructed to indicate 
the option that they liked more. The order of option presentation within each pair of choices was 
counterbalanced. Participants assigned to the non-comparative conditions were presented all four 
of these options one at a time, with products in the pen category preceding those in the TV 
program category. They were told to rate how much they like each option on a scale from 1(do 
not like it at all) to 5(like it very much). Like in the comparative conditions, order of option 
presentation within each category was counterbalanced. In a separate pretest, I found the TV 
programs to differ on their mood lifting properties, while the pens did not.  
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 To test our hypothesis, I used the proportion of participants who preferred one product 
over the other within the same category as the dependent measure (Bazerman, Loewenstein, and 
White 1992). Preference under the comparative conditions was determined by the participant’s 
stated choice, whereas preference under the non-comparative conditions was computed by 
comparing the participant's rating for each product in the same category. Participants who 
assigned equal ratings to both TV programs were grouped with those who preferred the news 
program. Participants who gave equal ratings to both types of pens were grouped with those who 
preferred the ballpoint pen.1
                                                          
1 I also adopted an exclusion approach in which cases within the non-comparative condition that assigned equal 
ratings to both options in each category were excluded from the analyses. Testing the hypothesis using this approach 
produced similar results. After excluding these cases, a chi-square analysis revealed a directional but non-significant 
three-way interaction (χ2 (1, N = 607) = 1.40, p = .24). Follow-up analyses nonetheless indicated a significant two-
way interaction between mood and task on TV program preference (χ2 (1, N = 310) = 6.07, p < .05) but not 
preference for pens (χ2 (1, N = 297) = .47, p = .49). In particular, among participants with negative affect, those 
performing the comparative task were more likely to prefer Saturday Night Life (74.2%) than those performing the 
non-comparative task (59.5%; χ2 (1, N = 163) = 3.98, p < .05); among participants with neutral affect, the same 
difference between the comparative (57.3%) and non-comparative conditions was non-significant (69.2%; χ2 (1, N = 
147) = 2.20, p = .14). In another approach, instead of excluding cases within the non-comparative condition that 
assigned equal ratings to both options in each category, I randomly assigned them as preferring either one of the 
options in each category. Using this randomization approach, a directional but non-significant three-way interaction 
emerged (χ2 (1, N = 676) = 1.29, p = .26). There was a significant two-way interaction between mood and task on 
TV program preference (χ2 (1, N = 338) = 5.95, p < .05) but not preference for pens (χ2 (1, N = 338) = .60, p = .44). 
Among participants with negative affect, those performing the comparative task were more likely to prefer Saturday 
Night Life (74.2%) than those performing the non-comparative task (57.8%; χ2 (1, N = 179) = 5.34, p < .05); among 
participants with neutral affect, the same difference between the comparative (57.3%) and non-comparative 
conditions was non-significant (66.2%; χ2 (1, N = 159) = 1.34, p = .25). 
 A chi-square analysis indicated a significant three-way interaction, 
χ2 (1, N = 676) = 5.79, p < .05. Consistent with the hypothesis, both manipulations produced the 
expected interaction on TV program preference (χ2 (1, N = 338) = 6.29, p < .05), but not vitamin 
preference (χ2 (1, N = 338) = .66, p = .41). Follow-up analyses showed that among participants 
induced with negative mood, those performing the comparative task preferred Saturday Night 
Life (74.2%) more often than those performing the non-comparative task (48.9%; χ2 (1, N = 179) 
=12.06, p < .005). In contrast, among participants induced with neutral affect, those performing 
the comparative task were not more likely to prefer Saturday Night Life (57.3%) than those 
13 
 
performing the non-comparative task (58.4%; χ2 (1, N = 159) = .02, p = .89). Therefore, these 
findings suggest that people in a negative mood are more likely to prefer the mood-reparatory 
product (e.g., Saturday Night Live) when preferences are elicited via comparative framing (i.e., 
alternatives differing on mood lifting properties are simultaneously presented as in a typical 
choice task) versus non-comparative framing (i.e., the same alternatives are presented in 
isolation as in a rating task).  
2.3. Differences in Need for Mood Regulation 
 Overall, the findings reviewed so far suggest that certain boundary conditions must be 
met for mood repair to occur and that under some circumstances (i.e., comparative presentation 
of mood repair alternatives) one’s tendency to repair their negative mood may even be enhanced. 
Nonetheless, inherent in a significant portion of this research (except for the research on self 
esteem and dysphoria) is the assumption that everyone possesses a need to repair their moods 
and strives to feel better when they experience unpleasant feelings. In this dissertation, I propose 
that individuals may differ in their need to feel better, and that distinguishing individuals on this 
need may account for some of the inconsistent findings in the mood repair literature.  
2.3.1. Indirect Evidence that People Differ in Need to Feel Better 
 Supporting the view that individuals may possess varying levels of need to feel better, 
some research suggests that people may not always perceive negative mood as a state that needs 
to be fixed. There is a body of literature suggesting that contrary to the hedonistic view of mood 
regulation, people may choose to invoke negative mood for instrumental purposes (see Tamir 
2009). In a study by Cohen and Andrade (2004), participants told that they are going to perform 
a study on impulse buying later on were more likely to select a sad (vs. happy) piece of music to 
down-regulate their mood, presumably to bolster impulse control, compared to control 
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participants who were not given information about the impulse buying study. They also showed 
that participants were more likely to regulate their moods downwards when they expected to 
perform an analytical task later on. Research has also suggested that people do seem to consume 
negative feelings and find enjoyment in doing so (e.g., reading tragic novels or watching horror 
shows; Andrade and Cohen, 2007).  
 As highlighted in the mood repair literature, there are various reasons why people may 
not want to repair their negative mood. For example, they may perceive such attempts as futile in 
lifting their mood (Smith and Petty 1995), or view themselves as less deserving of experiencing 
positive mood (Wood et al. 2009). We propose a novel hypothesis that some people in a negative 
mood may be less likely to engage in mood repair because they have a lower need to feel better. 
First, individuals may differ in their aversion toward negative feelings. This reasoning is built on 
work related to distress tolerance, a meta-emotion construct concerning people’s level of 
acceptance of and capacity to endure negative psychological states (Simons and Gaher 2005). 
Research in clinical psychology shows that lower distress tolerance activates greater coping via 
alcohol and substance use (Simons and Gaher 2005; Zvolensky et al. 2009). Hence, we expect 
that the more aversive people perceive their negative mood to be, the more likely they would be 
motivated to alleviate those feelings by engaging in mood repair. Second, individuals may differ 
in the level of pleasure they derive from being in a negative mood. This deviates from the 
hedonistic assumption that people necessarily dislike negative mood, and thus act to mitigate it 
(Morris and Reilly 1987). In line with this second reasoning, recent work by Harmon-Jones, 
Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Gable (2011) posits that there are individual differences in people’s 
attitudes toward specific emotions such as sadness, anger, fear, joy and disgust. In a study on 
emotion regulation, they found that participants with higher dislike for fear were more likely to 
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regulate their fear by avoiding fear-arousing stimuli after watching a fear-inducing video clip. 
Further evidence comes from Heimpel et al. (2002) who found that individuals with low self-
esteem have lower motivation to engage in mood repair. Among participants’ self-reported 
reasons for not trying to improve their mood, the most frequently cited reason (21.8%) was the 
desire to wallow in sadness. This work suggests that at some meta-evaluative level, some people 
may derive pleasure from dwelling in negative mood and may gain some pleasure from doing so. 
Third, individuals may differ in the degree to which they focus and reflect on their negative 
feelings, which is likely to dampen their motive to repair their mood. A prototype of such an 
individual would be the classic introvert, someone who is deeply involved in his or her own 
mental life (Eysenck and Eysenck 2013). People who are more inclined to reflect and introspect 
on their negative mood would be less motivated to do something to lift their mood. It is 
important to note that this act of introspection is different from rumination which encompasses a 
compulsion to focus one’s attention on the source of one’s distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
and Lyubomirsky 2008).  
2.3.2. Existing Measures Related to the “Need to Feel Better” Construct 
 Trait Meta-Mood Scale. Currently, the measure that is closest to our conceptualization of 
NFB is the mood repair subscale of the TMMS by Salovey et al. (1995). The TMMS was 
developed as a measure of emotional intelligence comprising three subscales (i.e., attention to 
feelings, clarity of feelings, and mood repair) which correspond to different competencies 
required in adaptive social behavior. The attention to feelings subscale taps on people’s tendency 
to monitor their moods (e.g., “I pay a lot of attention to how I feel”), whereas the clarity of 
feelings subscale taps on people’s ability to discriminate between different feelings (e.g., “I am 
rarely confused about how I feel.”). These two competencies allow people to draw on their 
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feelings to motivate and guide behavior in life (Salovey et al. 1995). More relevant to the current 
research is the mood repair subscale which measures people’s inclination to think about pleasant 
things when they are in a negative mood (e.g., “When I become upset I remind myself of all the 
pleasures in life.”). People who score high on this subscale are thought to be better at managing 
their moods, and thus have better psychological and interpersonal wellbeing (Salovey et al. 
1995). This subscale taps on individual differences in mood repair at the behavioral level and 
does not address people’s underlying intentions to engage in mood repair. My proposed NFB 
construct and scale primarily concerns people’s desire to lift their moods. Nonetheless, I predict 
a strong positive correlation between NFB and scores on the mood repair subscale in the TMMS. 
People with high NFB would be more likely to think of pleasant things when they experience 
negative mood.  
 In my research, I have found individual differences in people’s chronic mood repair 
tendency, as measured by the mood repair subscale from Salovey et al. (1995), to predict their 
preference for enjoyable activities (e.g., going for dinner with friends, or drinking wine) when 
they experience negative mood. I was particularly interested to examine whether framing 
enjoyable activities as productive (i.e., useful, beneficial, and practical) would increase people’s 
preference for such activities under negative mood. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a single 
factor (mood: negative vs. neutral) between-subjects experiment in the lab with a sample of 
student participants. Participants were told that they were going to participate in a few unrelated 
studies. In the first study, I informed them that they were going to take part in a study on writing 
skills that assessed people’s ability to accurately describe various life situations succinctly in a 
couple of sentences. In the negative mood condition, participants were told to describe five real-
life situations that never fail to put them in a bad mood. In the neutral mood condition, 
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participants described five commonplace things that are not particularly special that they 
frequently observed on their route to school or work. They had to write two full sentences for 
each situation. To strengthen the manipulation, participants had to choose one of the listed 
situations and elaborate on it using five to six sentences in a subsequent question. After 
completing this study, participants rated their mood and performed a filler task on perceptions of 
different countries. Following that, they participated in a scenario-based study in which they had 
to make a choice between having dinner with close friends that they often hang out with for fun, 
or with childhood friends whom they have not seen in a long time because these friends had 
moved to a different state. They had to indicate which of the two sets of friends they felt like 
having dinner with that night on a seven-point bipolar scale where one endpoint represents 
preference for dinner with the close friends and the other endpoint represents preference for 
dinner with the childhood friends. A prior pretest with another sample had shown that having 
dinner with childhood friends was seen as more productive but less mood-lifting activity 
compared to having dinner with close friends. Finally, they filled out the mood repair subscale 
from Salovey et al. Results revealed a significant interaction effect between mood and chronic 
mood repair tendency (β = .57, t(88) = 2.08, p < .05). A spotlight analysis further demonstrated 
that among participants with low mood repair tendency, those in the negative mood condition 
were more likely to prefer going to dinner with the childhood friends than those in the neutral 
mood condition (β = -.87, t(88) = -2.06, p < .05). However, among participants with high mood 
repair tendency, the same difference was not significant (β = .42, t(88) = .96, p =.34). 
Participants with high mood repair were more likely to prefer going to dinner with close friends 
irrespective of their negative mood condition, but participants with low mood repair were more 
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likely to prefer going to dinner with childhood friends when they were induced with a negative 
mood.  
 In a subsequent study, I aimed to replicate this finding and examine if participants with 
low mood repair are choosing productive options to feel better after being induced with negative 
mood. I ran a single-factor (productive frame: present vs. absent) between-subjects experiment in 
the lab using Columbia students. Similar to the previous study, participants were told that they 
would be participating in a series of unrelated studies. In the first study, I induced negative mood 
in all participants using a writing task. Participants were told that the researchers were 
developing a life-event inventory, and to help them generate items for this instrument, they 
would be providing descriptions of personal events. They were then asked to visualize as 
concretely as possible and describe in detail a personal event that happened to them and made 
them feel really sad. After performing this task, they rated their emotions and did a filler task 
about their opinions about U.S. businesses investing in Vietnam. Then, they were asked to do an 
ad evaluation study in which the critical dependent measure was administered. They were told 
that the researchers were interested in how people evaluate different advertisement appeals, and 
were asked to view an ad about a wine bar and answer some questions. Those in the productive 
frame condition were shown an ad with the appeal “Come learn about great wines! Come sample 
a glass of wine at the Verre Wine Bar and discover our rich Bordeaux and smooth Burgundies,” 
whereas those in the no productive frame condition were shown the same ad with a different 
appeal “Come enjoy great wines! Treat yourself to a glass of wine at the Verre Wine Bar and 
come savor our rich Bordeaux and smooth Burgundies.” After viewing their respective ads, 
participants indicated the extent to which they would be interested to visit the wine bar. 
Following that, participants rated how useful it would be for them to visit the wine bar, the extent 
19 
 
to which visiting the wine bar would make them feel happier, as well as some questions on their 
drinking habits. Finally, participants filled out an attitudes, beliefs and experiences survey which 
contained the mood repair subscale from Salovey et al. (1995).  
 Participants in the productive frame condition reported that it would be more useful for 
them to visit the wine bar and they can learn more from visiting the wine bar (M = 3.83) 
compared to participants in the no productive frame condition (M = 2.89; t(54) = -2.15, p < .05). 
Hence, the manipulation was successful in generating different perceptions of productivity 
associated with visiting the wine bar. Participants’ ratings of interest to visit the wine bar were 
submitted to an analysis of covariance with productive frame, mean-centered mood repair scores, 
their interaction term, and participants’ general liking for drinking wine as predictors. Results 
showed a significant interaction between productive frame and mood repair, (β = -.64, t(51) = -
2.45, p = .02), such that participants with low mood repair were more interested to visit the wine 
bar when the productive frame was present (β = .70, t(51) = 2.32, p = .03), but this difference 
was not significant among participants with high mood repair (β = -.35, t(51) = -1.20, p = .24). 
Importantly, the higher interest to visit the wine bar that was observed among participants with 
low mood repair appeared to be mediated by the belief that visiting the wine bar would make 
them feel happier, providing some evidence that individuals who score lower on the mood repair 
subscale generally possess some desire to feel better but are less inclined to act on this 
motivation than individuals who score higher on this scale. These findings also suggest that 
productive framing of a mood repair activity incentivizes people to engage in the activity when 
they are feeling down, perhaps by increasing their feelings of deservingness to feel better. 
 Negative Mood Regulation Scale. Another existing measure that is related to the NFB 
construct is the Generalized Expectancy for Negative Mood Regulation Scale (NMR; Catanzaro 
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and Mearns 1990). Items in this scale consists of expectancy statements about coping behaviors, 
and are classified into general items referring to the expectancy that negative mood can or cannot 
be alleviated (e.g., “When I’m upset, I believe that I can usually find a way to cheer myself up”), 
cognitive items about the expectancy that negative mood can be alleviated by various cognitive 
strategies (e.g., “When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll feel okay if I think about more pleasant 
times”), and behavioral items about the expectancy that negative mood can be alleviated by 
certain actions (e.g., “When I’m upset, I believe that I can feel better by treating myself to 
something I like”). If people believe that they can successfully make themselves feel better, they 
should be more likely to engage in attempts to alter such moods; conversely, if they have low 
expectancy about being able to lift their mood, they would be less likely to engage in these 
attempts (Catanzaro and Mearns 1990). This scale has been shown to predict people’s tendency 
to repair their bad moods (Tice et al. 2001), converging with past research showing that mood 
repair effects are diminished when subjects are given a bogus mood-freezing pill that causes 
them to perceive mood regulation efforts as ineffective (Bushman, Baumeister, and Philips 2001; 
Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini 1984). Both the NMR and NFB are related to people’s motives 
to engage in mood repair when they feel upset. However, the NFB pertains to people’s 
evaluations about their mood state, whereas the NMR concerns evaluations about regulation 
strategies.  
 Emotion-Focused Coping. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), coping efforts in 
response to threat can be either problem-focused (i.e., attempts to manipulate the environment to 
reduce stress) or emotion-focused (i.e., attempts initiated to regulate one’s emotional response to 
stress). For example, a consumer may cope with a rude sales clerk by reporting the behavior to a 
store manager or simply venting his emotions to “let off steam” or “cool down.” Although 
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people tend to use either types of coping or both depending on situational demands, there are 
chronic differences in the extent to which people employ these strategies to deal with stressors 
(Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub 1989). Furthermore, people can engage in various types of 
problem-focused coping (e.g., active coping and seeking instrumental support from others) and 
emotion-focused coping (e.g., seeking emotional support, emotional venting, and positive 
reappraisal; Carver et al. 1989). At a glance, NFB appears to be similar to emotion-focused 
coping given that both constructs are related to people’s tendency to regulate their affect in 
distress. Nonetheless, unlike existing scales on coping which simply measure the frequency at 
which people engage in different types of coping behavior to regulate their stress responses, the 
proposed NFB construct also taps onto the underlying motives that determine whether people 
engage in mood repair behaviors (e.g., aversion to negative feelings, preference to remain in a 
negative mood state, etc.). Moreover, some of the problem-focused coping strategies (e.g., 
problem-solving) could be employed with the motive of feeling better.  
2.4. Development of New Construct and Scale   
 In my dissertation, I develop a new construct called NFB and design a scale to measure 
this construct. As defined earlier, NFB refers to the desire people possess to improve their mood 
when they experience negative mood. I propose that individuals vary in their levels of NFB, and 
having a scale to measure NFB would help us to differentiate individuals on their levels of NFB. 
In order to construct this scale, I examined current measures in the literature that are relevant to 
affect regulation, and adapted items from these measures to generate items for the NFB scale. In 
addition, items were generated based on aspects that may differentially motivate people to feel 
better, for example, aversion to negative feelings, pleasure derived from negative feelings, and 
tendency to reflect on negative feelings. In this dissertation, I test the internal consistency, factor 
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structure, and test retest reliability of the scale. I also test the construct validity of the scale by 
examining its correlations with available measures that converge or diverge from the construct 
and measures that tap onto major marketing (e.g., impulsive buying, materialism, etc.) and 
psychological constructs (e.g., regulatory focus, Big Five personality traits, etc.). Finally, I 
investigate the predictive validity of the scale using experiments that test whether the NFB scale 
is associated with greater mood repair when people are in a negative versus neutral mood.  
2.4.1. Implications for Consumer Behavior 
 Differentiating individuals on their NFB is important from a theoretical perspective. First 
and foremost, it extends current understanding of why individuals are not motivated to terminate 
their negative mood, or why they even continue to dwell in it. Furthermore, it allows us to tease 
apart mood-congruency and mood-incongruency effects in the marketing literature (Andrade and 
Cohen 2004), thereby also accounting for inconsistent and weak effects of mood repair in 
research. From a practical standpoint, it enables marketers to identify consumers that are more 
attracted (or possibly experience more reactance) to mood repair appeals in the marketplace. 
Additionally, to the extent that engaging in mood repair predicts better psychological wellbeing 
and happiness, research-based interventions can be designed to motivate low-NFB individuals to 
repair their negative mood and increase their satisfaction with mood-reparatory activities. In 
what follows is a description of the scale development process, including evidence that the 





STUDY 1: DEVELOPING A SCALE TO MEASURE  
THE “NEED TO FEEL BETTER” 
3.1. Scale Development 
3.1.1. Item Generation  
 An initial pool of 73 items was generated based on my review of the affect regulation 
literature and instruments used to measure similar constructs. Twenty-three items were adapted 
based on Parrott’s (1993) conceptual framework of mood regulation motives; ten items were 
adapted from the meta-regulation subscale of the State Meta Mood Scale (Mayer and Stevens 
1994) that measures people’s meta-experiences of regulating their mood; eight items from the 
Distress Tolerance Scale (Simons and Gaher 2005) which measures the extent to which people 
can tolerate and cope with emotional distress; six items from Augustine, Hemenover, Larsen, and 
Shulman’s (2010) work on people’s motives for desired affective states, six items from the 
Negative Mood Regulation scale which measures people’s general expectancies that negative 
mood can or cannot be alleviated (Catanzaro and Mearns 1990); five items from the Attitudes to 
Emotions scale (Harmon-Jones et al. 2011) that measures people’s attitudes toward specific 
emotional states; three items from the Following Affective States Test (Gasper and Bramesfeld 
2006) which measures the propensity for individuals to notice both their positive and negative 
feelings and use the information provided by their feelings; and three items from the tolerating 
subscale of the Affective Styles Questionnaire which measures an accepting and tolerant attitude 
toward certain affective styles (Hofmann and Kashdan 2010). The remaining items were 
generated based on the definition of the construct. Next, I carefully evaluated all 73 items to 
determine if they tapped only onto the need to feel better and not other constructs. Items that 
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seem to capture other constructs and items that were poorly worded were eliminated, resulting in 
a reduced set of 49 items (see Appendix A for initial pool of 73 items and reduced set of 49 
items).  
3.1.2. Scale Purification 
 The 49 items were administered to a sample of 128 participants (52% female; mean age = 
35) located in America recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. To ensure that these online 
participants were paying careful attention to the items in our survey, I included instructions 
asking them to indicate particular responses for certain questions. Participants who failed to read 
these instructions would be more likely to indicate a different response. Nine participants failed 
these attention checks in the survey and were thus removed from the dataset. Participants 
responded to 19 of the items using a 6-point frequency scale (where 1 = never true, 6 = always 
true), and 20 of the items using a 6-point agreement scale (where 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = 
strongly agree). For each scale, I examined the corrected item-to-total correlations (α = .87 and 
.90 for frequency and agreement scales respectively) and assessed factor loadings using principal 
component factor analysis (4 factors emerged for the frequency scale, 6 factors emerged for the 
agreement scale). The items with low item-to-total correlations, items that loaded onto multiple 
dimensions and items that may seem confusing to participants were further eliminated, resulting 
in a set of 24 items. These items were administered to a new sample of 122 participants (46% 
female; mean age = 35) located in America recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Twenty 
participants failed the attention check in the survey and were thus removed from the dataset. 
Participants responded to all 24 items using the 6-point frequency scale. I enacted to remove the 
agreement scale because responses using this scale reflected participants’ beliefs and opinions 
about mood repair as opposed to their tendency or desire to feel better. I then removed and edited 
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items based on their item-to-total correlations (α = .87) and factor loadings (5 factors emerged), 
and administered the new set of items to another sample of participants from Mechanical Turk. 
This iterative process of the calculation of coefficient alpha, principal component factor analysis, 
elimination of items, and testing the new set of items with a fresh sample of participants was 
executed seven more times, with samples of respondents ranging from N = 50 to N = 132. The 
final version of the NFB scale includes 16 items that tap on four different dimensions: mood 
repair tendency, aversion to negative feelings, pleasure from negative feelings, and reflection on 
negative feelings. The final list of items is reported in table 2. Scores on the 16 items are 
averaged to compute NFB.  
3.2. Variability in the “Need to Feel Better” 
 My dissertation proposes that people vary considerably in the degree to which they need 
to feel better when they experience negative feelings. As shown in figure 1, which was plotted 
based on the sample of Mechanical Turk respondents who received the final set of 16 items in 
the scale purification process (31% female; mean age = 28), there was substantial variability in 
NFB scores (see table 1 for descriptive statistics). According to the Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality, respondents’ NFB scores were normally distributed (SW = .99, df = 119, p = .37).  
 
TABLE 1 
STUDY 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE NFB SCALE AND ITS SUBSCALES (N = 119) 
 





NFB .85 4.17 4.19 4.19   .66           .99 -.31 
Mood repair tendency .95 3.82 3.75 3.00 1.13           .98 -.03 
Aversion to negative feelings .92 4.27 4.25 5.00 1.08     .97* -.44 
Pleasure from negative feelings .93 1.93 1.75 1.00 1.06       .82** 1.53 
Reflection on negative feelings .90 3.49 3.50 3.00 1.08           .99 -.06 




STUDY 1: DISTRIBUTION OF “NEED TO FEEL BETTER” SCORES (N = 119) 
 
 
 There was also substantial variability in respondents’ scores on each of the four subscales 
(see figure 2). In particular, scores on the mood repair tendency (SW = .98, df = 119, p = .12) and 
the reflection on negative feelings subscales (SW = .99, df = 119, p = .35) followed a normal 
distribution. Respondents’ scores on the aversion to negative feelings and pleasure from negative 
feelings subscales were not normally distributed. Scores on the aversion to negative feelings 
subscale were negatively skewed such that a large proportion of respondents reported being 
relatively more averse towards the experience of negative feelings, whereas scores on the 
pleasure from negative feelings subscale were positively skewed such that a large proportion of 




























 In sum, although it is widely conceived that people have a universal motive to feel better, 
the current data demonstrates that there is a wide variation in people’s need to feel better. 
Nevertheless, respondents from the current sample had relatively greater aversion toward 





3.3. Scale Validation 
3.3.1. Factor Structure 
 To validate the internal structure of the NFB scale, I administered the 16-item measure to 
a different sample of 123 participants (52% female; mean age = 32) located in America from 
Mechanical Turk. Three participants failed the attention check in the survey and were thus 
removed from the dataset. Internal consistency of the set of items was satisfactory; the 
coefficient alpha for the full scale was .85 (alphas for each subscale ranged from .91 to .94). A 
principal component factor analysis of the 16 items yielded a four-factor solution with each 
factor having an eigenvalue greater than one and each item having a factor loading above .85. To 
further assess the dimensionality of the scale, I performed a confirmatory factor analysis using 
SAS PROC CALIS to test a model containing a higher-order factor structure with four lower-
order dimensions (see table 2). Goodness-of-fit statistics suggested that the higher-order model 
fit the data well (χ2 (100) = 114.56, p = .15, goodness-of-fit index = .90, adjusted goodness-of-fit 
index = .87, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .04, Bentler’s Comparative Fit 
Index = .99, normed fit index = .93). I performed the same procedure to test a one-factor model, 
in which all 16 items were made to load on a single factor, a four-factor uncorrelated model, in 
which all 16 items were made to load on four uncorrelated factors, and a four-factor correlated 
model, in which all 16 items were made to load on four correlated factors. Results showed that 
the higher-order model demonstrated superior fit to the one-factor and four-factor uncorrelated 
models and similar fit to the four-factor correlated model (see Appendix B for goodness-of-fit 

















Mood repair tendency (α = .92)     
When I’m feeling down or blue, I do whatever I can to make myself 
feel better. 
.91    
When I’m in a bad mood, I try to do things that make me feel happier. .86    
When I'm feeling bad, I try to find ways to improve how I feel. .85    
When I’m feeling upset, I immediately do something to feel better. .83    
Aversion to negative feelings (α = .94)     
Being in a negative mood really bothers me.  .91   
It bothers me when I'm upset.  .90   
When I’m in a bad mood, it disturbs me.  .88   
I can't stand being in a bad mood.  .86   
Pleasure from negative feelings (α = .92)     
I derive some pleasure from being in a bad mood.*   .92  
I enjoy how it feels when I am feeling sad.*   .88  
I find some comfort in being upset.*   .86  
I like how it feels when I'm upset.*   .76  
Reflection on negative feelings (α = .91)     
When I'm upset, I prefer to reflect on the underlying cause, rather 
than try to change how I feel.* 
   .92 
When I’m feeling upset, I think about the reasons why I’m feeling 
that way instead of trying to make myself feel better.* 
   .91 
When I am in a negative mood, I try to understand why, rather than 
cheer myself up.* 
   .81 
It is more important to me to understand the cause of my negative 
feelings than to make myself feel better.* 
   .77 
NOTE.—Items with asterisked are reverse-scored.  
 
 To explore how the four facets are associated with each other, I used SAS PROC CALIS 
to analyze the data through the structural equations model shown in figure 3. The findings 
suggested that the model produced a reasonable fit (χ2 (94) = 111.59, p = .104, goodness-of-fit 
index = .90, adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .86, root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) = .04, Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index = .99, normed fit index = .93). The same 
procedure was used to test a rival model in which links from the baseline model that were not 
significant were excluded from the model. This rival model included a causal path from aversion 
to negative feelings to mood repair tendency, a causal path from reflection on negative feelings 
to mood repair tendency, as well as a reciprocal link between aversion to negative feelings and 
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pleasure from negative feelings. Results showed that the rival model demonstrated similar fit to 
the baseline model (χ2 (95) = 112.39, p = .108, goodness-of-fit index = .90, adjusted goodness-
of-fit index = .86, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .04, Bentler’s 
Comparative Fit Index = .99, normed fit index = .93). Estimated values of the parameters in both 
models are shown in table 3.  
FIGURE 3 
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NOTE.—MR refers to the individual items in the mood repair tendency subscale, AN refers to the 
individual items in the aversion to negative feelings subscale, PN refers to the individual items in the 
pleasure from negative feelings subscale, and RN refers to the individual items in the reflection from 
negative feelings subscale.  
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 Overall, these findings suggest that aversion to negative feelings bolsters mood repair 
tendency, whereas reflection from negative feelings tends to dampen mood repair tendency. 
However, pleasure from negative feelings does not directly influence people’s mood repair 
tendency. In addition, there is a reciprocal relationship between aversion to negative feelings and 
pleasure from negative feelings: people with high aversion to negative feelings are likely to gain 
less pleasure from these feelings; at the same time, people who tend to enjoy dwelling in their 
negative feelings are likely to be more tolerant of such feelings.  
TABLE 3 
STUDY 1: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS OF  
NFB SUBSCALES 
Baseline Model  Rival Model 
Parameters Estimated Values  Parameters Estimated Values 
φ1     .850 (27.84)  φ1     .850 (27.82) 
φ2     .909 (39.61)  φ2     .909 (39.62) 
φ3     .857 (28.97)  φ3     .857 (28.95) 
φ4     .832 (25.17)  φ4     .832 (25.18) 
λ1     .902 (42.07)  λ1     .902 (42.07) 
λ2     .885 (36.96)  λ2     .885 (36.98) 
λ3     .914 (45.96)  λ3     .914 (45.90) 
λ4     .865 (32.18)  λ4     .865 (32.19) 
γ1     .855 (29.03)  γ1     .855 (29.02) 
γ2     .924 (44.13)  γ2     .923 (44.09) 
γ3     .884 (34.59)  γ3     .884 (34.53) 
γ4     .755 (17.45)  γ4     .756 (17.49) 
Ψ1     .809 (22.51)  Ψ1     .809 (22.51) 
Ψ2     .909 (39.96)  Ψ2     .910 (40.00) 
Ψ3     .918 (42.08)  Ψ3     .918 (42.08) 
Ψ4     .770 (18.63)  Ψ4     .770 (18.62) 
δ1   -.342 (-3.92)  δ1  -.343 (-3.94) 
δ2 -.090 (-.92)  β1  .329 (3.78) 
δ3 .048 (.10)  β3  -.192 (-2.12) 
β1   .297 (3.14)    
β2 -.088 (-.91)    
β3   -.191 (-2.11)    
NOTE.—For the sake of simplicity, only the estimated values of the φ, λ, γ, Ψ, δ, and β parameters 
are presented. Numbers inside the parentheses are the t-values of the estimates. All the parameters 




3.3.2. Construct Validity 
 To establish the construct validity of NFB, I examined how scores on the NFB scale 
would correlate with other scales. To test the convergent validity of the construct, I administered 
the NFB scale with the mood repair subscale from the TMMS (Salovey et al. 1995), as well as a 
scale tapping onto people’s beliefs that they can savor positive experiences (Bryant 2003). Given 
that the mood repair subscale assesses people’s mood repair behavior, I expected people’s 
motivation to feel better to predict higher scores on this scale. Additionally, to the extent that 
people believe they can sustain and enjoy the positive affective experience that they are 
regulating towards, they should be more motivated to feel better. Hence, I expected NFB to have 
a positive association with people’s savoring beliefs. To test the divergent validity of the 
construct, I administered the NFB scale with scales that assess the degree to which people attend, 
perceive, and experience their feelings (attention to feelings and clarity of feelings subscales in 
the TMMS by Salovey et al.; affect intensity measure by Larsen 1984). I expected the NFB’s 
correlations with these scales to be weaker compared to NFB’s correlations with the mood repair 
subscale from the TMMS and the savoring beliefs inventory, both of which are more related to 
mood regulation. For instance, people’s tendency to attend to their feelings is not indicative of 
their attitudes or preferences for either positive or negative feelings. Similarly, it is not clear 
whether the extent to which one can accurately perceive the nature of their feelings or one’s 
proneness towards experiencing intense feelings would affect their motivation to change their 
feelings. Someone who experiences affect intensely, for example, may enjoy both negative and 
positive mood, or dislike affective experiences altogether. Hence, I considered individual 
differences in attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, and affect intensity to be discriminant 
constructs from NFB. To ensure that people’s responses on the NFB are not driven by their 
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desire to impression-manage but by their desire to feel better, I administered the Crowne-
Marlowe Scale which assesses social desirability bias.  
 I administered the NFB, TMMS (Salovey et al. 1995), Affect Intensity Measure (AIM; 
Larsen 1984), an adapted version of the Savoring Beliefs Inventory (SBI; Bryant 2003), and the 
Crowne-Marlowe Scale (Crowne and Marlowe 1960) to a sample of 207 Mechanical Turk 
participants (43% female; mean age = 32) located in America. After completing these measures, 
participants were asked to provide their demographic information. Twenty-nine participants 
failed the attention check in the survey and were thus removed from the dataset. The correlations 
between NFB and these variables are described in table 4.  
 
TABLE 4 



























Convergent validity:       
Mood repair  .85 .47**** .54****   .11 -.38****  -.19* 
Savoring beliefs  .90 .29**** .34****   .04 -.37****  -.06 
Discriminant validity:       
Attention to feelings  .87 .15* .16*   .32**** -.07   .19* 
Clarity of feelings  .89 .22*** .28**** -.01 -.36**** -.02 
Affect intensity  .83 .13 .11   .26***   .06   .05 
Social desirability:       
Crowne-Marlowe    - .05 .03   .00 -.24***   .04 
 *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. ****p < .001. 
 
 Convergent Validity. To assess convergent validity, I examined whether NFB is related to 
the mood repair subscale from the TMMS and the SBI. The 6-item mood repair subscale 
measures people’s attempts at repairing unpleasant moods or maintaining pleasant ones (e.g., 
“When I become upset, I remind myself of all the pleasures in life” and “Although I am 
sometimes happy, I have a mostly pessimistic outlook;” Salovey et al. 1995). The SBI assesses 
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individuals’ perceptions of their ability to gain pleasure from anticipating positive outcomes and 
savor positive moments (e.g., “I find it hard to hang onto a good feeling” and “I feel fully able to 
appreciate good things;” Bryant 2003). As predicted, NFB was positively correlated with mood 
repair (r = .47, p < .001) and perceived ability to savor positive feelings (r = .29, p < .001), 
providing evidence for convergent validity. The moderate correlations seemed to suggest that 
both scales may capture aspects of mood regulation that are different from NFB. Specifically, 
there could be other motivations apart from the need to feel better that may account for people’s 
mood repair behavior. Also, although the extent to which people believe they can savor positive 
feelings might increase motivation to feel better, as evidenced by its lack of association with the 
aversion to negative feelings and reflection on negative feelings subscales, there are other 
antecedents of people’s motives to feel better (i.e., the desire to escape or mull over negative 
feelings).  
 Discriminant Validity. To assess discriminant validity, I examined whether NFB is 
associated with the attention to feelings and clarity of feelings subscales from the TMMS 
(Salovey et al. 1995), and the AIM (Larsen 1984). The 13-item attention to feelings subscale 
measures the extent to which individuals attend to and think about their feelings (e.g., “I pay a lot 
of attention to how I feel” and “I don’t pay much attention to my feelings;” Salovey et al. 1995). 
The 11-item clarity of feeling subscale measures people’s perceived ability to understand and 
describe what they are feeling (e.g., “I am usually very clear about my feelings” and “I am rarely 
confused about how I feel;” Salovey et al. 1995). The 20-item AIM reflects the strength with 
which people experience their emotions (e.g., “When I’m happy, I feel very energetic” and 
“’Calm and cool’ could easily describe me;” Larsen 1984). As predicted, correlational analyses 
revealed that the NFB had smaller positive correlations with attention to feelings (r = .15, p < 
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.05), clarity of feelings (r = .22, p < .005), and affect intensity (r = .13, p < .1) than with mood 
repair and savoring beliefs. These modest correlations provide support for the discriminant 
validity of the NFB. In particular, the NFB scale taps on people’s preference for positive mood 
and motivation to improve their mood when they experience bad mood, whereas these scales tap 
on people’s chronic monitoring of their feelings, ability to tell them apart, and the intensity at 
which they experience these feelings, constructs that are less motivational in nature. 
 Social Desirability. To ensure that social desirability did not affect participants’ 
responses on the NFB scale, participants completed the Crowne-Marlowe Scale (Crowne and 
Marlowe 1960). The scale assesses people’s tendency to answer questions in a manner that will 
be viewed favorably by others, and comprises 33 True-False items (e.g., “There have been 
occasions when I have taken advantage of someone,” and “I always try to practice what I 
preach”). The scale is scored based on the number of socially desirable responses that 
respondents provide. I did not find NFB to be significantly correlated with the scores on the 
Crowne-Marlowe Scale. Overall, the NFB scale does not seem to be susceptible to social 
desirability bias. However, I did find a negative correlation between the pleasure from negative 
feelings subscale and social desirability (r = -.24, p < .005). Participants might have been under-
reporting the amount of pleasure they derive from negative experiences in order to appear 
favorably to others. There were no correlations between the Crowne-Marlowe Scale and the 
other subscales in the NFB scale.  
3.3.3. Test-Retest Reliability 
 To determine test-retest reliability, I invited 800 Mechanical Turk participants who had 
previously filled out the NFB scale (these participants filled out other scales in addition to the 
NFB scale; see chapter 4) to take part in a follow-up study for bonus compensation. Of the 800 
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participants, 198 responded to the follow-up survey which took place one month after their initial 
participation. Twenty-nine participants failed the attention checks from the first survey they took 
and were thus removed from the data. A further 24 participants were removed from the data set 
for failing the attention checks in the follow-up survey, resulting in a final sample of 145 
participants. The follow-up survey at time 2 included the NFB scale and some demographic 
questions. I performed correlational analyses between the two NFB measures (table 5). The NFB 
scale demonstrated low, but acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .61), providing some support for 
the stability of the measure. Whereas the mood repair tendency and aversion to negative feelings 
subscales had good test-retest reliability (r = .72 and .66 respectively), the pleasure from 
negative feelings and reflection on negative feelings subscales had lower test-retest reliability (r 
= .47 for both scales) than the other two subscales. The low correlation between the pleasure 
from negative feelings subscale at time 1 and time 2 could be associated with the subscale’s 
susceptibility to social desirability bias. It is more uncertain why the correlation between the 
reflection on negative feelings subscale at time 1 and time 2 is low. Perhaps both the pleasure 
from negative feelings and reflection on negative feelings are prone to situational influences in 
the environment and are thus less stable compared to the other two subscales.  
TABLE 5 
STUDY 1: TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY FOR NFB FULL SCALE AND SUBSCALES 
 















Time 1      
NFB full scale      .61****        .45****        .48****         -.30****         -.26*** 
Mood repair tendency      .44****        .72****        .26***         -.06         -.02 
Aversion to negative feelings      .47****        .22**        .66****         -.16*         -.07 
Pleasure from negative feelings    -.29****        .03      -.20*          .47****          .12 
Reflection on negative feelings   -.33****      -.11      -.03          .21*          .47**** 





STUDY 2: PREDICTORS AND CORRELATES OF  
THE “NEED TO FEEL BETTER” 
 To investigate how NFB is associated with various self-regulation constructs, marketing 
constructs, psychological wellbeing, personality traits, and lifestyle variables, I administered the 
NFB along with a variety of scales from these domains to several different samples of 
Mechanical Turk participants (N = 520; 51% female; mean age = 33). The relationships between 
NFB and these variables are presented in table 6, along with the Cronbach alphas of each scale 
and sizes of the samples that I administered each scale to. Consolidating data from all these 
samples, I found that female participants had a higher NFB than male participants (Mfemale = 4.52 
vs. Mmale = 4.29; t(518) = 4.17, p < .001). Compared to male participants, female participants 
reported deriving lower pleasure from negative feelings (Mfemale = 1.44 vs. Mmale = 1.66; t(518) = 
-3.47, p < .005), and higher aversion to negative feelings (Mfemale = 4.82 vs. Mmale = 4.37; t(518) 
= 4.94, p < .001). This is consistent with the finding that females tend to experience more 
negative affect and emotional difficulties but equal positive affect and happiness as men (Fujita, 
Diener, and Sandvik 1991), suggesting that females tend to dislike negative feelings and are thus 
inclined to make themselves feel better. Furthermore, there was a significant positive correlation 
between NFB and age (r = .09, p < .05). Older people also reported gaining less pleasure from 
negative feelings (r = -.16, p < .001) and being less likely to reflect on negative feelings (r = -
.09, p < .05). This is consistent with Carstensen’s theory of socioemotional selectivity which 
states that as people age they prioritize emotional goals over other goals (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, 
and Charles 1999). Older people are more likely than younger people to value emotional 
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satisfaction and tend to display a positivity effect (i.e., relative preference for positive over 
negative information in attention and memory; Kennedy, Mather, and Carstensen 2004).  
FIGURE 4 




4.1. Self-Regulation Constructs  
 Given that mood repair pertains to self-regulation, I was interested to examine how NFB 
would relate to other self-regulation constructs including regulatory focus, approach and 
avoidance motivations, and self-control (see table 6).  
4.1.1. Regulatory Focus 
 According to regulatory focus theory, there are two independent self-regulatory 




STUDY 2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NFB AND VARIOUS SELF-REGULATION, MARKETING,  



























Self-regulation constructs:        
Promotion focus  181 .76   .25***   .36****  .09 -.15 -.03 
Prevention focus  181 .89  -.08  -.03 -.11  .01  .04 
BAS drive 178 .87  -.20**  -.27** -.14  .03  .02 
BAS reward responsiveness 178 .78  -.14  -.14 -.13  .03  .03 
BAS fun seeking 178 .82  -.11  -.19* -.11  .03 -.06 
Behavioral inhibition 178 .87   .07   .21** -.24 -.19* -.09 
Self-control 181 .89   .04   .18* -.15* -.12  .02 
Marketing constructs:        
Consumer emotional intelligence  181   -  -.07  -.05 -.05 -.01  .07 
Material values  181 .91   .00  -.02   .01 -.01 -.01 
Compulsive buying  181 .83   .05  -.02   .06  .07 -.11 
Consumer impulsiveness  182 .91 -.06  -.06 -.09  .00 -.01 
Psychological well-being:        
Current life satisfaction 167   -   .21****   .23***   .08 -.18*   .06 
Future life satisfaction 167   -   .15   .24***   .09 -.11   .05 
Satisfaction with Life Scale 167 .93   .19*   .27**** -.02 -.16* -.08 
Self esteem scale 167 .93   .28****   .33****   .03 -.24*** -.13 
Subjective happiness  167 .92   .26***   .37****   .03 -.19* -.08 
Depression symptoms 167 .97 -.15  -.11   .09  .20*   .18* 
Anxiety symptoms 167 .94 -.11   .13   .09  .31****   .24*** 








TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
STUDY 2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NFB AND VARIOUS SELF-REGULATION, MARKETING,  



























Personality traits:        
Big Five extraversion  167 .89   .21**   .28****   .12 -.06  -.05 
Big Five agreeableness  167 .83   .31****   .25***   .26*** -.36****   .04 
Big Five conscientiousness   167 .86   .22**   .08   .09 -.29****  -.12 
Big Five neuroticism 167 .89 -.17* -.24***   .10   .21**   .11 
Big Five openness 167 .84   .04   .07   .09 -.11   .16* 
Values:        
Importance of religion in life 172   -   .19*  .15   .20* -.11  -.05 
Lifestyle variables:        
Liking for shopping 172   -   .26***  .28****   .16*   .00  -.16* 
Frequency of leisure shopping 172   -   .24***  .30****   .13   .04  -.15 
Feeling-based self-gifting factor 172 .92   .12  .31****   .13   .15   .06 
Occasion-based self-gifting factor 172 .87   .10  .22**   .03   .15*  -.07 
Average donation per year 172   -   .11  .12   .06  -.01  -.07 
Junk food consumption per week 172   - -.05  .02   -.06   .08   .03 
Consciousness about calories 172   -   .01  .13   .11   .14   .13 
Frequency of alcohol per week 172   - -.09  .06  -.08   .25*   .05 
Average sleep per night 172   -   .00  .02   .05   .05   .04 
Exercise frequency per week 172   -   .19*  .19*   .06  -.05  -.16* 
Average duration watching TV per 
day 
172   -   .13  .15*   .15*  -.07   .03 
NOTE.— Ns reflect final sample after removing 95 participants (29-36 people per sample) who failed attention checks. BAS = Behavioral 





focus, he or she is concerned with attaining gains and avoiding non-gains; goals are viewed as 
ideals and pertain to hopes, accomplishments and advancement (Crowe and Higgins 1997). 
When one adopts a prevention focus, he or she is concerned with avoiding losses and 
maintaining non-losses; goals are viewed as oughts and pertain to safety, security and 
responsibility (Crowe and Higgins 1997). To measure participants’ chronic regulatory focus, I 
administered the 11-item Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al. 2001) that 
consists of 6 items that tap onto promotion focus (e.g., “I feel like I have made progress toward 
being successful in my life,” and 5 items that tap onto prevention focus (e.g., “How often did you 
obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?” Results showed a significant 
positive correlation between NFB and promotion-focus (r = .25, p < .005), a strategic concern 
with the presence or absence of positive outcomes. This relationship was mainly driven by the 
correlation between the mood repair tendency subscale and promotion-focus, consistent with past 
research showing that promotion-focus is associated with greater mood repair (Arnold and 
Reynolds 2009). Individuals with high promotion-focus may be more sensitive to the gains in 
happiness resulting from mood regulation efforts and therefore experience greater engagement in 
such goals. 
4.1.2. Behavioral Approach and Inhibition Systems 
 The behavioral approach system governs appetitive motives where the goal is to attain a 
desired outcome, whereas the behavioral inhibition system governs aversive motives where the 
goal is to avoid undesired outcomes (Carver and White 1994). To assess participants’ chronic 
activation of their behavioral approach and inhibition systems (i.e., approach and avoidance 
motivation respectively), I administered the 20-item Behavioral Inhibition and Activation Scales 
(BIS/BAS; Carver and White 1994) which consists of four subscales: 1) BAS Drive subscale that 
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measures people’s levels of drive in goal pursuit (e.g., “I go out of my way to get things I want”), 
2) BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale which measures people’s sensitivities to signals of 
reward (e.g., “When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it”), 3) BAS Fun Seeking 
subscale which measures people’s sensitivities to fun in goal-seeking (e.g., “I'm always willing 
to try something new if I think it will be fun”), and 4) BIS which measures people’s sensitivity 
toward punishment (e.g., “I worry about making mistakes”). Results showed a significant 
negative association between NFB and the drive subscale which captures one’s persistence in 
pursing desired goals (r = -.20, p <.01). This association was mainly driven by the correlation 
between drive and mood repair tendency. The negative association between NFB and drive 
suggests that people with greater goal persistence may prioritize other goals over mood repair 
when they feel upset.  
4.1.3. Self-Control  
 Individuals often experience impulses to behave in ways that deviate from their personal 
goals or social norms. For example, people with weight loss goals may be tempted to consume 
high-caloric, unhealthy foods. The capacity to inhibit these impulses is called self-control 
(Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice 1994). To test whether NFB is related to individual differences 
in self-control, I administered the 10-item brief self-control scale by Tangey, Baumeister, and 
Boone (2004). It contains items such as “I get distracted easily” and “I say inappropriate things.” 
Results showed that there was no significant correlation between NFB and self-control. 
However, self-control was positively correlated to the mood repair tendency subscale and 
negatively correlated to aversion to negative feelings subscale. These relationships might have 
emerged because engaging in mood repair behaviors constitutes exertion of self-control over 
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one’s negative feelings. Low tolerance for negative feelings might be perceived as failure to 
control one’s negative emotions.  
4.2. Marketing Constructs  
 I wanted to explore how NFB would relate to major marketing constructs in the literature 
such as consumer emotional intelligence (Kidwell, Hardesty, and Childers 2008), materialism 
(Richins and Dawson 1992), compulsive buying (O’Guinn and Faber 1989), and consumer 
impulsiveness (Puri 1996). These constructs were chosen because of their relevance to affective 
experiences.  
4.2.1. Consumer Emotional Intelligence 
 Consumer emotional intelligence pertains to consumers’ “ability to skillfully use 
emotional information to achieve a desired consumer outcome” (Kidwell et al. 2008, 154), and is 
a construct developed based on Mayer et al.’s (2003) framework of emotional intelligence. The 
Consumer Emotional Intelligence Scale assesses consumers’ ability to perceive, facilitate, 
understand, and manage emotions in the consumer domain. Correlational analyses did not reveal 
any significant correlations between emotional intelligence and NFB. Although emotional 
intelligence concerns people’s ability to manage their emotions, it does not capture people’s 
inherent preferences to engage in mood repair. 
4.2.2. Materialism  
 Materialism is the importance people place on ownership and acquisition of material 
goods as a means to achieve desired states or life goals (Richins 2004). People high on 
materialism are more likely to judge the success of others and oneself based on material 
possessions, believe the centrality of possessions in one’s life, and believe that possessions lead 
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to life satisfaction and happiness. To measure people’s levels of materialism, I administered the 
9-item Material Values Scale (MVS; Richins 2004) which comprises of items such as “I like to 
own things that impress people,” “Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure,” and “I'd be happier 
if I could afford to buy more things.” Correlational analyses showed that NFB was not 
significantly correlated to material values.  
4.2.3. Compulsive Buying and Impulsiveness 
 Compulsive buying refers to “chronic, repetitive purchasing that occurs as a response to 
negative events or feelings” (O’Guinn and Faber 1989, 149). As implied in the definition, 
compulsive buyers are likely to use buying as a means to regulate their feelings. To measure 
compulsive buying tendencies, I administered the 6-item compulsive buying scale (Ridgway, 
Kukar-Kinney, and Monroe 2008) which comprises two subscales: the obsessive-compulsive 
buying scale (e.g., “I consider myself an impulse purchaser”) and the impulsive buying scale 
(e.g., “I buy things I did not plan to buy”). Consumer impulsiveness concerns people’s 
propensity to favor options that offer immediate hedonic benefits over options that offer larger 
later rewards. Impulsiveness has been found to be pervasive in consumption behavior (c.f. Rook 
1987). To examine the relationship between NFB and impulsiveness, I administered the 
Consumer Impulsiveness Scale by Puri (1996) which contains 12 adjectives (e.g., impulsive, 
extravagant, etc.) that participants rate themselves on.  
 Correlation analyses did not reveal any significant correlations between NFB and these 
scales. Consequently, people with high NFB need not use the accrual of material goods and 
compulsive buying as means to repair their mood; given their chronic need to improve their 
mood, they may use various strategies to mood repair. Similarly, impulsiveness is related to 
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specific preference for immediate hedonic rewards but is not restricted to situations where one 
experiences bad mood.  
4.3. Psychological Well-Being  
 Given the aim of mood repair that is to decrease negative affect and increase positive 
affect, I investigated how NFB would be associated with psychological well-being. Two 
predictions could be made: 1) people with higher NFB generally experience lower psychological 
well-being and are thus more motivated to feel better; and 2) to the extent that people have 
higher NFB and act on it, they experience greater positive affect and subjective well-being.  
4.3.1. Life Satisfaction and Subjective Happiness 
 To measure life satisfaction, I administered two questions that utilize the Cantril Self-
Anchoring Scale (Cantril 1965). Participants were asked to imagine a ladder with steps 
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible 
life for the participants and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for the 
participants. They were instructed to indicate which step they were standing on at this time (i.e., 
current life satisfaction) and in five years from this time (i.e., future life satisfaction). The 5-item 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; e.g., “The conditions of my life are excellent;” Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin 1985) and the 4-item Subjective Happiness Scale (e.g., “In general, 
I consider myself a very happy person;” Lyubomirsky and Lepper 1999) were also administered 
along with the Cantril scales. Results showed that people with higher NFB reported greater 
current life satisfaction as measured by the Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale (r = .21, p < .001) and 
the SWLS (r = .19, p < .05). Furthermore, people with high NFB reported greater subjective 
happiness in their lives (r = .26, p < .005).These relationships were primarily driven by the 
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positive association between these constructs and the mood repair tendency subscale, and to a 
lesser degree, their negative association with the pleasure from negative feelings subscale. 
4.3.2. Self Esteem  
 The 10-item Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem scale (e.g., “I feel that I am a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others;” Rosenberg 1965) was used to measure self esteem. 
Consistent with Heimpel and colleagues’ work (2002) that people with lower self esteem are less 
likely to engage in mood repair behaviors, a positive association between NFB and self esteem 
emerged (r = .28, p < .001). In particular, participants with lower self esteem had lower mood 
repair tendencies and were more likely to derive pleasure from these moods. 
4.3.3. Negative Emotional Symptoms 
 To test whether NFB predicts people’s experience of negative affect, I administered the 
42-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond and Lovibond 1995) which consists 
of three scales: 1) the depression scale which assesses symptoms of depression such as 
dysphoria, hopelessness, and anhedonia, 2) the anxiety scale which assesses anxiety symptoms 
such as autonomic arousal and subjective experience of anxious affect, and 3) the stress scale 
which assesses symptoms pertaining to stress such as irritability, being easily agitated, and 
difficulty relaxing. Correlational analyses revealed non-significant negative relationships 
between NFB and each of the three scales. Nonetheless, the pleasure from negative feelings 
subscale was positively correlated with depression, anxiety and stress symptoms. The reflection 
on negative feelings subscales was positively correlated with depression and anxiety symptoms. 
These findings are unsurprising given that people who tend to focus on and derive pleasure from 
negative feelings would be more likely to experience and dwell in negative emotions.  
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 To the extent that people engage in efforts to mood repair, they derive more pleasant 
experiences in life. Hence, support was found for the latter prediction that higher NFB would be 
associated with better psychological well-being. 
4.4. Personality Traits 
 In order to examine whether NFB could explain certain personality styles, I administered 
the Big Five Personality Inventory along with the NFB scale (John, Donahue, and Kentle 1991; 
John, Naumann, and Soto 2008). The Big Five consists of five constituent traits: 1) Openness to 
experience which reflects the degree of curiosity and appreciation for novelty and variety of 
experience that one possess; 2) Conscientiousness which reflects the tendency to be self-
disciplined and organized; 3) Extraversion which reflects the extent to which one is sociable and 
outgoing; 4) Agreeableness which reflects the tendency to be cooperative, warm and considerate; 
and 5) Neuroticism which reflects the degree to which one has low emotional stability and is 
vulnerable to negative emotions such as anxiety and depression.  
 Significant relationships between NFB and four of the Big Five personality traits 
emerged. Specifically, people who were more extraverted had higher NFB (r = .21, p < .01) and 
mood repair tendency (r = .28, p < .001). These individuals may be more likely to engage in 
social interactions as a strategy to lift their mood when they feel down. Interestingly, NFB was 
also positively associated with agreeableness (r = .31, p < .001) and conscientiousness (r = .22, p 
< .01). Correlations between agreeableness and the pleasure from negative feelings, aversion 
toward negative feelings, and mood repair tendency subscales seem to suggest that agreeable 
individuals tend to be cooperative and maintain positive social relations to avoid negative 
feelings. The negative correlation between conscientiousness and pleasure from negative feelings 
suggests that people who are conscientious find negative feelings to less enjoyable. 
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Unsurprisingly, there was a negative association between NFB and neuroticism (r = -.17, p < 
.05). Given that neurotic individuals tend to interpret ordinary circumstances as threatening 
(Eysenck and Eysenck 2013), they seem to induce rather than dampen negative feelings in 
themselves. It is interesting that people who are more neurotic derive more pleasure from 
negative feelings, suggesting that their heightened experience of negative emotions may be 
reinforced by the pleasure they get from these feelings.   
4.5. Values and Lifestyle Variables 
 Finally, I examined how NFB may be correlated with different lifestyle variables. I asked 
participants how much they liked shopping and how frequently they shopped for leisure, and 
found these two items to be positively correlated with NFB (r = .26, p < .005 and r = .24, p < 
.005 respectively). Given the ready access to shopping opportunities and the pervasive notion of 
retail therapy in modern society, people with high NFB may be more likely to employ shopping 
as a mood repair strategy. I also designed questions aimed at measuring the degree to which 
people buy themselves gifts. Seven of these items were grouped to form a feelings-based self-
gifting factor (e.g., “I give myself a gift to cope with stress,” “I give myself a gift as a reward for 
working hard on something”), while three of them were grouped to form an occasion-based self-
gifting factor (e.g. “I give myself a gift on my birthday”). Although these two factors were not 
significantly correlated with the full NFB scale, they were positively associated with the mood 
repair tendency subscale (r = .31, p < .001 and r = .22, p < .01 for feelings- and occasion-based 
self gifting respectively), supporting the nomological validity of the subscale.  
 Participants were also asked to report the frequency at which they exercise and consume 
junk food and alcohol, as well as their consciousness about consuming high-caloric foods. 
People with higher NFB reported exercising more frequently each week (r = .19, p < .05), 
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suggesting that these individuals may be more likely to use exercise as a mood repair strategy. 
NFB was not significantly correlated with frequency of consuming junk food and alcohol, and 
consciousness about calories. Participants also reported the amount of time they spent sleeping 
per night and watching television per day. NFB was not significantly correlated with average 
sleep duration and average duration of watching television. However, greater mood repair 
tendency and aversion to negative feelings predicted longer durations of watching television, 
suggesting that people with higher tendency to engage in mood repair and lower tolerance for 
negative feelings may distract themselves and lift their mood by watching television programs.  
 In addition, I asked participants to indicate how important religion is in their own life and 
how much money on average they donate to charity or the needy each year. I found that people 
with higher NFB perceived religion as more important in their life (r = .19, p < .05), and this 
relationship was driven mainly by their aversion toward negative feelings. NFB did not predict 
the amount of donation participants contributed each year.  
 The current study demonstrates that NFB is associated with important constructs in the 
areas of self-regulation and personality. It is also predictive of several lifestyle variables as well 
as psychological well-being. Importantly, females and older individuals tended to have higher 
levels of NFB. The significant correlations that emerged suggest opportunities for interventions 
that influence consumers’ behavior and psychological outcomes (e.g., mood lifting appeals that 
target shoppers in malls, manipulating people’s NFB to encourage exercise behavior, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the current results are correlational and do not imply causation. Future research 
should investigate the underlying mechanisms of these relationships, and design interventions 





STUDY 3: DOES NFB PREDICT PEOPLE’S PREFERENCE FOR UPLIFTING MUSIC 
UNDER NEGATIVE MOOD? 
 To test my theoretical framework that NFB predicts people’s tendency to engage in mood 
repair when they experience bad mood, I ran a single-factor between subjects two-part lab 
experiment in which participants were asked to provide their responses to the NFB scale during 
the first part, and were induced with negative (versus neutral) mood and asked to make choices 
between items that aid or do not aid in mood repair during the second part that took place two 
weeks later. I hypothesized that among high-NFB participants, those induced with negative 
mood would be more likely to select mood lifting options compared to those induced with 
neutral mood, whereas this difference would not be significant among low-NFB participants. 
There were also four additional goals pertaining to this study. First, I wanted to examine again 
the test-retest reliability of the NFB scale using the two-part design of the study. Second, I 
wanted to investigate whether NFB was associated with different cultures and experienced 
parenting styles. Third, I was interested to examine whether people who score higher on the NFB 
scale simply have higher private self-consciousness, and are thus more able to introspect on their 
affective experiences. Fourth, I wanted to examine whether day-to-day affect as opposed to 
general psychological wellbeing would also be associated with people’s NFB.  
5.1. Collection of Participants’ Responses on the NFB Scale in Part 1 
 Two hundred and eighteen participants (140 female; mean age = 23) were recruited from 
Columbia Business School’s behavioral lab panel to participant in this study. Participants were 
paid $2 for their participation in part 1, and were told that they will be paid $6 for their 
participation in part 2. Ten participants failed the attention checks (similar to those in the surveys 
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administered on Mechanical Turk) and were thus removed from the sample. All participants 
were asked to fill out the NFB scale (α = .84) and other measures including the 6-item mood 
repair subscale of the TMMS (Salovey et al. 1995), private self-consciousness scale (Scheier and 
Carver 1985), self-construal scale (Singelis 1994), as well as the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988). After filling out the NFB scale, participants 
filled out the other measures in the listed order and answered some demographic questions.  
5.1.1. Measures 
 Participants first responded to the 6-item mood repair subscale from the TMMS (Salovey 
et al. 1995). Then, they answered the 9-item private self-consciousness scale, which measures 
the extent to which people think about and attend to their personal thoughts and feelings that are 
not easily accessible to scrutiny by others (Scheier and Carver 1985). Examples of items include 
“I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I think about myself a lot”. Next, participants 
filled out the self-construal scale which has two subscales, a 12-item independent self-construal 
subscale and a 12-item interdependent self-construal subscale (Singelis 1994). The independent 
subscale measures the extent to which individuals see themselves as unique and separate from 
others, a value that is often stressed in the West, and contains items such as “My personal 
identity independent of others, is very important to me” and “I act the same way no matter who I 
am with”. The interdependent subscale measures the extent to which individuals emphasize their 
connectedness and relatedness to others, a value often found in non-Western cultures, and 
contains items such as “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group” and “I have 
respect for the authority figures with whom I interact”. Finally, participants completed the 
PANAS, a checklist of adjectives related to various affective states (Watson et al. 1988). It 
measures the degree to which people experience various positive (e.g., excited, interested) and 
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negative affective states (e.g., irritable, hostile). In the current study, participants were told to 
rate the degree to which they experienced ten positive affective states and ten negative affective 
states over the past two weeks.  
5.1.2. Results 
 Correlational analyses were performed on all the measures collected in the study (see 
table 7). Replicating the previous finding on convergent validity, NFB was positively correlated 
with the mood repair subscale of the TMMS (r = .37, p < .001). NFB was also significantly 
negatively correlated with private self-consciousness (r = -.14, p = .045). People with higher 
NFB are less attuned to their personal thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, results showed 
significant positive correlations between NFB and both independent self-construal (r = .19, p = 
.007) and interdependent self-construal (r = .19, p = .007). (Controlling for the covariance 
between both subscales in a linear regression indicated that both uniquely predicted NFB.) It was 
also found that people who have a higher NFB tend to experience more positive affect (r = .14, p 
= .05) but not the experience of negative affect in the past two weeks.  
 
TABLE 7 



























Mood repair subscale .76   .37***   .53****   .22***  -.27****   .05 
Private self-consciousness .78  -.14*  -.04   .03   .09   .25**** 
Independent self-construal .64   .19**   .36****   .13  -.16*   .15* 
Interdependent self-construal .71   .19**   .27****   .12  -.10   .03 
Positive affect .88   .14*   .32****   .08  -.09   .12 
Negative affect .83  -.03  -.10   .16*   .08   .07 





 In part 1 of study 3, the correlation between NFB and the TMMS mood repair subscale 
from the earlier surveys was replicated, supporting the convergent validity of the NFB scale. 
Furthermore, there was a relationship between private self-consciousness and NFB, driven 
mainly by the positive association between private self-consciousness and tendency to reflect on 
one’s negative feelings. The negative relationship between NFB and private self-consciousness 
runs contrary to the alternative account that people who score higher on the NFB scale are more 
attuned to their feelings and are therefore more likely to regulate their feelings. The finding that 
higher NFB is associated with greater happiness was also conceptually replicated; people with 
high NFB experienced greater positive affect in the past two weeks. Interestingly, NFB was 
positively associated with both independent and interdependent self-construal, suggesting that 
people with stronger cultural identities, whether individualistic or collectivistic, are more 
motivated to feel better when they experience bad mood. These relationships are driven mainly 
by general mood repair tendency suggesting the possibility that strategies of mood repair or even 
the idea that people should do something to repair their negative mood may be inculcated 
through culture. Finally, similar to my previous findings that NFB was not significantly 
associated with depression, anxiety and stress, I did not find a significant association between 
NFB and negative affect in the past two weeks.  
5.2 Negative Mood Induction and Mood Repair in Part 2 
 One hundred and fifty participants returned two weeks later to participate in part 2 of the 
study (102 female; mean age = 23). Participants were randomly assigned to either a negative 
mood condition (n = 79) or a neutral mood condition (n = 71). Following the mood 
manipulation, participants were asked to make several choices between options that were either 
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mood lifting or non-mood lifting. Finally, they answered some control questions and several 
scales including, in this order, the NFB scale, the mood repair subscale from the TMMS, the 
Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI; Parker, Tupling, and Brown 1979), and the NMR scale which 
measures people’s general expectancies about the effectiveness of mood regulation strategies 
(Catanzaro and Mearns 1990).  
5.2.1. Procedure 
 Participants were told that they would be participating in several unrelated short studies. 
The mood manipulation was disguised as a study on “Rating Movies” in which the researchers 
were interested in understanding how viewers perceive programs based on viewing only selected 
segments of the show. Participants watched two video clips. The first clip, which was the same 
for the entire sample, was a documentary from the History Channel. The second clip differed 
depending on which condition participants were assigned to. Those in the negative mood 
condition watched a clip containing segments from Lorenzo’s Oil, a movie about a young boy 
who is diagnosed with a rare medical condition and his parents’ desperate and relentless search 
for a cure as his health declines. Those in the neutral mood condition watched a documentary on 
the development of the first general-purpose computing device, a predecessor of modern 
computers. After watching these two clips, participants answered some questions regarding each 
clip. For each clip, they were asked to indicate whether they have seen the show from which the 
scenes were taken, what the gist of the clip was, who the main characters were, whether the story 
made sense to them, and whether they would be interested to watch the full show. Then they 
rated their current mood as a manipulation check on two 7-point bipolar scales where 1= 
unpleasant/bad mood and 7= pleasant/good mood. These scores were averaged to form a mood 
index (r = .89).  
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 Next, participants were introduced to a second study in which the researchers were 
interested in consumer’s evaluations of various forms of mass media such as newspaper articles, 
recorded films and music. They were told that they would be reviewing and rating several 
different forms of media. In addition, we told them that they would only review a subset of these 
items because reviewing these items takes time. Hence, they could choose what they would like 
to review. Participants were then presented with a choice of listening to two pieces of 
instrumental music that were not mood lifting (a distractor question), followed by a choice of 
listening to a happy (“Laughs and Swings”) or sad (“A Rainy Day”) piece of instrumental music 
(key dependent variable). After making their music choices, they listened to the song they chose 
and rated their experience listening to the song on two 7-point scales where 1 = did not enjoy it 
at all/not at all pleasant and 7 = enjoyed it very much/very pleasant (r = .91). After listening to 
the song, participants answered open-ended questions that asked them to explain their choices.  
 Finally, participants were asked to complete a set of personality questionnaires including 
the NFB scale (α = .86), TMMS mood repair subscale (α = .74), PBI, and NMR scale (α = .87). 
The PBI scale comprises a set of 25 items related to two different parenting styles that 
respondents experienced as they were growing up: care and overprotection (Parker et al. 1979). 
Participants were asked to indicate on two separate sets of scales the extent to which each of 
their parents demonstrated certain behaviors. Example care items include “Spoke to me in a 
warm and friendly voice” and “Was affectionate to me” (α = .92 for mother; α = .90 for father). 
Example overprotection items include “Tried to control everything I did” and “Tried to make me 
feel dependent on her/him” (α = .88 for mother; α = .81 for father). The 30-item NMR scale 
measures generalized expectancies about the effectiveness of negative mood regulation strategies 
(e.g., “When I’m feeling upset, I believe I can usually find a way to cheer myself up” and “When 
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I’m feeling upset, I believe I won’t feel much better by trying to find some good in the situation 
(reverse-coded)”; Catanzaro and Mearns 1990). Before leaving the session, participants rated 
how sad and happy each option in the second study was, and rated their current mood on the 
same two bipolar scales (r = .86) they used to rate their mood prior to the second study.  
5.2.2. Results 
 Manipulation Checks. Eighteen people were excluded from the current sample (three 
participants guessed the hypothesis, two participants had problems with the computer, and the 
remaining participants failed the attention checks). Responses on the mood manipulation check 
questions were submitted to a linear regression with mood condition (coded as -1 if negative and 
1 if neutral), mean centered NFB scores from part 1, and their interaction term as predictors. 
There was a significant main effect of the mood condition such that participants in the negative 
mood condition experienced more unpleasant and bad mood (M = 3.89) compared to the 
participants in the neutral mood condition (M = 4.94) after the mood manipulation (t(128) = 
3.88, p < .001). The main effect of NFB and the interaction effect between the mood condition 
and NFB were not significant.  
 Participants’ perceptions of how happy and sad the two songs, “Laughs and Swings” and 
“A Rainy Day,” were also submitted to linear regression analyses using the same predictors. No 
significant effects emerged. Paired t-tests indicated that in general participants perceived 
“Laughs and Swings” (M = 6.39) as a happier song than “A Rainy Day” (M = 3.12; t(131) = 
22.33, p < .001), and “A Rainy Day” (M = 5.08) as a sadder song than “Laughs and Swings” (M 
= 1.69; t(131) = -22.57, p < .001).  
 Main Analyses. Participants’ choice of song (coded as 0 if “A Rainy Day” and 1 if 
“Laughs and Swings”) was submitted to a binary logistic regression with mood condition (coded 
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as -1 if negative and 1 if neutral), mean centered NFB scores from part 1, and their interaction 
term as predictors. Results showed a significant main effect of NFB on choice of song (β = .92, 
Wald = 7.05, p = .008) such that participants with a higher NFB were more likely to choose the 
mood lifting song. More importantly, there was a significant interaction effect (β = -.74, Wald = 
4.59, p = .032; see figure 5). This interaction effect remained significant even after controlling 
for participants’ responses on the mood repair subscale of the TMMS measured at both time 1 (β 
= -.73, Wald = 4.42, p = .035) and time 2 (β = -.73, Wald = 4.41, p = .036), as well as the NMR 
scale measured at time 2 (β = -.75, Wald = 4.66, p = .031).  
FIGURE 5 
STUDY 3: THE EFFECT OF MOOD CONDITION AND NFB ON CHOICE OF “LAUGHS AND SWINGS” 
 
   
A spotlight analysis revealed that among participants with high NFB (+1 SD above the sample 
mean), those induced with negative mood were more likely to choose “Laughs and Swings” over 





























Minus 1SD NFB 
Plus 1SD NFB 
58 
 
Among participants with low NFB (-1 SD below the sample mean), likelihood of selecting the 
mood lifting song was not significantly different across conditions (β = .21, Wald = .65, p = 
.419). This provides validating evidence that the NFB scale predicts tendency to engage in mood 
repair when one experiences negative mood.  
 Running the same binary logistic regression using NFB at time 2 in place of NFB at time 
1 produced a directionally consistent but nonsignificant interaction effect (p = .155). Running the 
same analysis using the mood repair subscale of the TMMS at both time 1 and time 2, and the 
NMR scale at time 2 in place of the NFB did not produce any significant results (p’s > .55), 
demonstrating predictive ability of the NFB over these two scales.  
 Participants’ enjoyment and pleasure derived from listening to the song clip they chose 
was also regressed on the same predictors using linear regression. Results indicated a significant 
main effect of mood condition, such that participants in the negative mood condition enjoyed 
listening to their chosen piece of music more than neutral mood participants (β = -.31, t(131) = -
2.00, p = .047), and a significant main effect of NFB, such that participants with higher NFB 
enjoyed listening to their chosen piece of music more (β = .64, t(131) = 2.54, p = .012). There 
was also a directionally consistent but non-significant interaction effect that was similar to the 
main finding above (β = -.43, t(66) = -1.69, p = .093). Specifically, among high-NFB 
participants, those in the negative mood condition enjoyed listening to the song they chose more 
than those in the neutral mood condition (β = -.56, t(131) = -2.62, p = .01). However, this 
difference was not significant among low-NFB participants (β = -.05, t(131) = -.21, p = .831).  
 Correlation between Measures. To assess test-retest reliability, NFB scores from part 1 
were correlated with NFB scores from part 2 (see table 8). The NFB scale demonstrated 
acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .73, p < .001), providing further support for the stability of 
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the measure. Correlational analyses also revealed that NMR was significantly positively 
correlated with NFB at both time1 (r = .31, p < .001) and time 2 (r = .42, p < .001). The modest 
correlations demonstrate the discriminant validity of NFB from the NMR scale. In addition, we 
found significant positive correlations between the care by mother subscale of the PBI and NFB 
at time 1 (r = .22, p = .013) and time 2 (r = .24, p = .005), and a significant negative correlation 
between the overprotection by mother subscale and NFB at time 1 (r = -.20, p = .023) and time 2 
(r = -.17, p = .05). These findings suggest that parental upbringing may exert some influence on 
people’s level of NFB.   
TABLE 8 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NFB AND MEASURES COLLECTED IN PART 2 OF STUDY 3 


























Time 2       
NFB  .83  .73****   .59****   .53**** -.57**** -.15 
Mood repair tendency .93  .44****   .68****   .22* -.23**  .02 
Aversion to negative 
feelings  
.89  .48****   .34****   .57**** -.33****  .06 
Pleasure from negative 
feelings  
.90 -.51****  -.30****  -.37****   .79**** -.10 
Reflection on negative 
feelings 
.91 -.41****  -.17  -.17  -.12  .53**** 




.84  .31****   .49****   .14  -.24**  .06 
Care by mother .91  .22*   .11   .10  -.11 -.20* 
Care by father .89  .07  -.03   .06   .00 -.12 
Overprotection by 
mother 
.86 -.20*  -.13  -.06   .11  .19* 
Overprotection by 
father 
.82 -.17  -.10  -.03   .05  .22* 






 In study 3, I obtained evidence of the moderating role of NFB on mood repair. In 
particular, high-NFB participants were more likely to repair their bad moods than low-NFB 
participants. In addition, both mood repair as measured by the TMMS as well as generalized 
expectancies of mood regulation success as measured by the NMR did not moderate people’s 
tendency to choose the uplifting instrumental music piece, demonstrating stronger predictive 
validity of the NFB scale over these existing measures. It should however be noted that NMR 
was measured after participants made their song choice. Just as NFB measured at time 2 did not 
interact significantly with mood to produce mood repair effects, participants’ responses on the 
dependent measure might have influenced their responses on the NMR. 
 I also examined test-retest reliability in the current study. Test-retest reliability in the 
current student sample was higher than test-retest reliability in the Mechanical Turk sample. This 
could be due to the shorter test-retest time interval (one month vs. two weeks) in the current 
study. It is also possible that the student participants in the lab were more serious and careful in 
filling out these scales. I also found that NFB was positively associated with success 
expectancies of negative mood regulation, consistent with the idea that people with higher NFB 
tend to be more successful at regulating their mood upwards, which in turn enhances their beliefs 
in the efficacy of negative mood regulation strategies. Nonetheless, the correlation was modest, 
demonstrating that these constructs are different from each other.  
 Finally, experiencing greater care from one’s mother in the past was positively associated 
with NFB, whereas being overprotected by one’s mother was negatively associated with NFB. 
This suggests the possibility that from an early age, individuals with high NFB are protected by 
their mothers (likely the main caregiver for most of the students in the current sample) from 
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focusing and ruminating on their negative mood states. Similar results were obtained in a 
subsequent survey with a separate sample of Mechanical Turk workers (N = 206; 78 female; 
mean age = 34). In this survey, participants were asked to fill out the NFB scale and answer 
some questions concerning their family’s economic condition when they were growing up, the 
relationship between their parents, their relationship with each of their parents, and how involved 
each of their parents were in raising them. I also administered an adapted version of the PBI: 
participants were instructed to indicate the most important and the second most important 
caregiver or major parental influence in their life, and respond to the items in the PBI based on 
these two persons that were indicated. Seventy-eight percent (14%) of the participants indicated 
that their mother (father) was the most important caregiver (others indicated a grandparent, older 
sibling or foster parent). Fifty-nine percent (15%) of the participants indicated that their father 
(mother) was the second most important caregiver (others indicated a grandparent, aunt, uncle, 
older sibling or foster/step-parent parent). Results showed that relationship and involvement but 
not economic situation (p = 1.00) were correlated with NFB. Specifically, higher NFB was 
positively associated with closer relationships between one’s parents (r = .15, p = .032), greater 
maternal involvement (r = .17, p = .014), and closer relationship with one’s mother (r = .12, p = 
.088). NFB was not significantly correlated with paternal involvement and closeness in 
relationship with one’s father (p’s > .21). Replicating the findings pertaining to care and 
overprotection from the current study, I found a significant positive association between NFB 
and the amount of care received from the most important caregiver (r = .27, p < .001) as well as 
the second most important caregiver (r = .17, p = .014), and a significant negative association 
between NFB and the amount of overprotection from the most important caregiver (r = .15, p = 
.032) as well as the second most important caregiver (r = .15, p = .032). Taken together, these 
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findings suggest that care and nurturance from one’s caregivers foster stronger motives to engage 
in mood repair, while experiencing constraints and control from one’s caregivers dampens 
motives to engage in mood repair. Future research could further explore developmental 




STUDY 4: DOES NFB PREDICT PEOPLE’S PREFERENCE FOR HAPPY NEWS  
UNDER NEGATIVE MOOD? 
 In study 3, I obtained supporting evidence that NFB predicts people’s tendency to mood 
repair using happy-sounding music when they experience negative mood. The current study was 
conducted as a conceptual replication of the previous study. Similar to study 3, I ran a single-
factor between-subjects experiment in which participants were asked to provide their responses 
to the NFB scale during the first part, and were induced with negative (versus neutral) mood and 
asked to make choices between items that aid or do not aid in mood repair during the second part 
that took place two weeks later. Note that the sample from the previous study consisted of 
student lab participants and people’s preferences for music of different valence was the main 
dependent variable. To test the generalizability of the effect beyond a student population, I 
recruited Mechanical Turk workers as participants and measured people’s preferences for 
reading news of different valence in this study.  
 I hypothesized that among high-NFB participants, those induced with negative mood 
would be more likely to select news content that appear more mood lifting compared to those 
induced with neutral mood; this difference would not be significant among low-NFB 
participants. Furthermore, NFB would have greater predictive validity than the TMMS (Salovey 
et al. 1995) and NMR (Catanzaro and Mearns 1990) scales. An additional goal of this study was 
to investigate whether there were any associations between NFB and people’s political beliefs 





6.1. Collection of Participants’ Responses on the NFB Scale in Part 1 
 Two hundred and seventy-seven U.S. based participants (138 female; mean age = 35) 
were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in this study. Participants were 
paid $0.25 for their participation in part 1. Seventeen participants failed the attention check and 
were thus excluded from the sample. All participants were asked to fill out the NFB scale (α = 
.85), the NMR scale (α = .93; Catanzaro and Mearns 1990), as well as the 6-item mood repair 
subscale of the TMMS (α = .86; Salovey et al. 1995). After filling out these scales in order, 
participants answered a series of questions adapted from the Pew Research Center’s (2014) 
public opinion polls regarding their political attitudes and personal values (see Appendix C for 
full set of questions) before filling out the demographic questionnaire.  
6.1.1. Results  
 Correlational analyses were performed on all the measures collected in the study (see 
table 9). NFB was positively correlated with both the NMR scale (r = .44, p < .001) and the 
mood repair subscale of the TMMS (r = .44, p < .001). To analyze how NFB relates to political 
attitudes and personal values items, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis using varimax 
rotation to cluster the items into separate dimensions. Nine factors emerged from this analysis 
(see Appendix C). Correlational analyses performed on NFB and these nine factors revealed a 
significant positive association between factor 1, which comprises of items describing beliefs 
related to American identity and superiority (α = .84; r = .19, p = .002), as well as a significant 
positive association between factor 2, which comprises of items concerning conservative and 
traditional values (α = .80; r = .14, p = .025). Items from factor 4 were split into two sub-
dimensions: items related to expectancies of success due to hard work (r = .60) and items related 




CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NFB AND MEASURES COLLECTED IN PART 1 OF STUDY 4 
 
was positively correlated with expectancies of success due to hard work (r = .17, p = .005), but 





















TMMS Mood repair subscale   .44****       .62****    .08       -.20***     -.16** 
Negative Mood Regulation Scale   .44****       .63****    .05       -.18***       -.18*** 
Factor 1 (American identity and 
superiority) 
.19*** .13*      .15* -.07 -.11 
Factor 2 (Conservative and 
traditional values) 
    .14*       .12    .08 -.02 -.11 
Factor 3 (Interest in politics)    -.01 .16*   -.07   .06  .06 
Expectancies of success due to hard 
work 
    .17**       .22****    .05 -.06 -.08 
Endorsement of government aid for 
poor 
   -.03      -.04  -.02  .09 -.06 
“This country should do whatever it 
takes to protect the environment.” 
    .03 .14*     .16* -.04          .24**** 
“People in this country should learn 
to live with less.” 
    .04       .10   .09 -.07    .15* 
“I recycle and reuse as a daily 
habit.” 
    .01    .20***   .05  .02        .19*** 
“Government is almost always 
wasteful and inefficient.” 
    .02      -.08   .08 -.02 -.02 
“Most elected officials care what 
people like me think.” 
   -.14*        .04   -.14*          .23****  .03 
“We should pay less attention to 
problems overseas and 
concentrate on problems here at 
home.” 
    .09      -.07    .15*       -.21***  .04 
“U.S. efforts to solve problems 
around the world usually end up 
making things worse.” 
  -.12      -.08  .01   .05   .15* 
“Too much power is concentrated in 
the hands of a few large 
companies.” 
   .02       -.02  .08  -.08 .08 
“I am sometimes uncomfortable 
being around people not of my 
race.” 
 -.17**       -.14* -.05       .16** .08 
“I couldn’t vacation without my 
smart phone” 
 -.05       -.01  .05   .12 .05 
“Americans need to be willing to 
give up privacy and freedom in 
order to be safe from terrorism.” 
  .01        .18***  .05    .14* .08 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. ****p < .001. 
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Because the Cronbach’s alphas for factors 5 to 9 were low, I examined the correlations between 
NFB and the individual items from these factors. Results indicated significant negative 
associations between NFB and agreement on the statement “Most elected officials care what 
people like me think” (r = -.14, p = .027) and between NFB and agreement on the statement “I 
am sometimes uncomfortable being around people not of my race” (r = -.17, p = .005). All these 
correlations remained significant after controlling for political affiliation.  
6.1.2. Discussion 
 NFB was found to be positively associated with both the TMMS mood repair subscale 
and the NMR scale, replicating findings from the earlier studies. Interestingly, I found that 
people with higher NFB had stronger American identities, espoused views that supported the use 
of military force to ensure peace in the world and were more concerned that increased 
immigration would negatively impact their society. They also tended to hold more religious and 
traditional values about family and morality, and believed that hard work and determination 
would lead to success in life. Finally, people with higher NFB were less likely to believe that 
elected officials cared about what they thought and are less likely to experience discomfort from 
being around people who are not from their racial group.  
6.2. Negative Mood Induction and Mood Repair in Part 2 
 One hundred and seventy-nine participants (89 female; mean age = 37) participated in 
part 2 of the study one to two weeks later. They were paid $0.90 for their participation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a negative mood condition (n = 86) or a neutral 
mood condition (n = 93). Following the mood manipulation, participants were asked to make 
several choices between news article options that were either mood lifting or non-mood lifting. 




 Participants were told that they would be participating in several unrelated short studies. 
Similar to study 3, the mood manipulation was disguised as a study on “Rating Movies” in which 
the researchers were interested in understanding how viewers perceive programs based on 
viewing only selected segments of the show. However, instead of watching two video clips, 
participants watched only one clip which differed depending on which condition they were 
assigned to. Those in the negative mood condition watched a clip containing a scene from The 
Champ about a young boy crying over the death of his mentor. This video clip has been used in 
past research (e.g., Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl 2008) as a manipulation of negative mood. 
Those in the neutral mood condition watched a shorter version of the same documentary on 
computing devices that was used in study 3. After watching their assigned video clip, 
participants answered some questions regarding its content. These questions were similar to the 
ones asked in study 3. Then they rated their current mood as a manipulation check on two 7-
point bipolar scales where 1= unpleasant/bad mood and 7= pleasant/good mood. These scores 
were averaged to form a mood index (r = .95).  
 Next, participants were introduced to a second study in which the researchers were 
interested in consumer’s evaluations of various forms of mass media such as news articles. They 
were told that they would be reviewing and rating several different news articles, and that 
because it takes time to review these items, they would be asked to choose what they would like 
to read. Participants were then presented with six different pair-wise choices of news article 
headlines: three of the pairs included neutral options that were not mood lifting (distractor 
questions), and the other three pairs valenced options that differed in terms of how mood lifting 
they were (key dependent variable). The distractor choices were: 1) “Flaw is found in digital 
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phone system that may let hackers get free service” versus “Microsoft is defensive over media 
strategy;” 2) “Peugeot recalls 1.18 million SUVs over airbag issue” versus “Volkswagen 
expands recall over ignition switch problems;” and 3) “City upgrades flood prediction system” 
versus “Renovation work continues at local schools.” The three critical choices were: 1) 
“Vietnam vets still battle PTSD decades later” versus “Mother and son reunited after 60 years;” 
2) “40-year-old family restaurant razed to the ground after fire broke out” versus “Harvey the 
happy hound crowned as ‘Britain’s smiliest pet’ thanks to gleaming grin;” and 3) “Doctor 
convicted of shaking daughter, causing death” versus “Full monty ignites U.K. fashion craze: 
Men’s birthday suits.” The distractor and critical choices were alternated.  
 After participants indicated their choices, they answered open-ended questions that asked 
them to explain their choices and rated their current mood on the same two bipolar scales (r = 
.95) they used to rate their mood prior to the second study. Then they read the article they chose 
in the choice between “Vietnam vets still battle PTSD decades later” versus “Mother and son 
reunited after 60 years,” and rated their experience of reading the article on two 7-point scales 
where 1 = did not enjoy it at all/not at all pleasant and 7 = enjoyed it very much/very pleasant (r 
= .74). Each article comprised approximately 1000 words. Finally, participants were asked to 
complete the NFB scale (α = .89) and rate how sad and happy each option in the second study 
was before filling out some demographic questions.  
6.2.2. Results 
 Manipulation Checks. Nineteen people who failed the attention checks were excluded 
from the current sample. Responses on the manipulation check questions were submitted to a 
linear regression analysis with mood condition (coded as -1 if negative and 1 if neutral), mean 
centered NFB scores from part 1, and their interaction term as predictors. There was a significant 
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main effect of the mood condition such that participants in the negative mood condition 
experienced more unpleasant and bad mood (M = 3.89) compared to the participants in the 
neutral mood condition (M = 5.94) after the mood manipulation (t(156) = 9.93, p < .001). There 
was also a significant main effect of NFB such that people with higher NFB experienced a better 
mood (t(156) = 2.11, p = .037). The interaction effect between mood condition and NFB was not 
significant.  
 The same linear regression analysis was conducted on participants’ perceptions of how 
happy the mood lifting option was relative to the unpleasant option in each pair. There was a 
significant main effect of NFB on how happy the news “Mother and son reunited after 60 years” 
was relative to the news “Vietnam vets still battle PTSD decades later” (t(156) = 3.07, p = .003). 
The main effect of the mood manipulation and the interaction effect between the mood 
manipulation and NFB were not significant. There was also a significant main effect of NFB on 
how happy the news “Harvey the happy hound crowned as ‘Britain’s smiliest pet’ thanks to 
gleaming grin” was relative to the news “40-year-old family restaurant razed to the ground after 
fire broke out” (t(156) = 2.34, p = .021), but non-significant main effect of the mood 
manipulation and interaction effect between the mood manipulation and NFB. Similarly, there 
was a significant main effect of NFB on how happy the news “Full monty ignites U.K. fashion 
craze: Men’s birthday suits” was relative to the news “Doctor convicted of shaking daughter, 
causing death” (t(156) = 4.34, p < .001), but non-significant main effect of the mood 
manipulation and interaction effect between the mood manipulation and NFB. In sum, compared 
to low-NFB participants, high-NFB participants tended to view the mood-lifting option as much 
happier than the unpleasant option in each pair. Paired t-tests indicated that participants generally 
perceived “Mother and son reunited after 60 years” (M = 5.86) as happier news than “Vietnam 
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vets still battle PTSD decades later” (M = 1.97; t(159) = 29.80, p < .001), “Harvey the happy 
hound crowned as ‘Britain’s smiliest pet’ thanks to gleaming grin” (M = 6.36) as happier news 
than “40-year-old family restaurant razed to the ground after fire broke out” (M = 2.07; t(159) = 
33.56, p < .001), and “Full monty ignites U.K. fashion craze: Men’s birthday suits” (M = 5.60) 
as happier news than “Doctor convicted of shaking daughter, causing death” (M = 1.44; t(159) = 
33.59, p < .001).  
 Main Analyses. The number of happy news articles participants chose among the three 
critical choices was submitted to a multiple linear regression with mood condition (coded as -1 if 
negative and 1 if neutral), mean centered NFB scores from part 1, and their interaction term as 
predictors. Results showed a significant main effect of mood such that participants in the 
negative mood condition selected more happy news than those in the neutral mood condition (β 
= -.17, t(156) = -2.24, p = .026). There was also a significant main effect of NFB on number of 
happy news selected (β = .27, t(156) = 2.30, p = .023) such that participants with higher NFB 
selected more happy news. More importantly, there was a significant interaction effect (β = -.29, 
t(156) = -2.40, p = .018; see figure 6). This interaction effect remained significant even after 
controlling for participants’ responses on the mood repair subscale of the TMMS (β = -.28, 
t(155) = -2.34, p = .02) and the NMR scale (β = -.30, t(155) = -2.49, p = .014). A spotlight 
analysis revealed that among participants with high NFB (+1 SD above the sample mean), those 
induced with negative mood selected more happy news compared to those induced with neutral 
mood (β = -.35, t(156) = -3.28, p = .001). Among participants with low NFB (-1 SD below the 
sample mean), the same difference was not significant (β = .02, t(156) = .14, p = .885). This 
provides validating evidence that the NFB scale predicts tendency to engage in mood repair 
when one experiences negative mood.   
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 Running the same linear regression using NFB at time 2 in place of NFB at time 1 
produced significant main effects of the mood condition (β = .16, t(156) = -2.09, p = .038) and 
NFB (β = .28, t(156) = 2.40, p = .018), as well as the same interaction effect (β = -.25, t(156) = -
2.14, p = .034). Spotlight analyses also revealed a significant effect of mood among participants 
with high NFB (β = -.32, t(156) = -3.01, p = .003) but not participants with low NFB (β = .01, 
t(156) = .05, p = .961). Running the same analysis using the mood repair subscale of the TMMS 
and the NMR scale in place of the NFB did not produce any significant results (p’s > .82), 
demonstrating predictive ability of the NFB scale over these two scales.  
FIGURE 6 
STUDY 4: THE EFFECT OF MOOD CONDITION AND NFB ON  
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regression. Results indicated a significant main effect of NFB, such that participants with higher 
NFB enjoyed reading their chosen article more (β = .56, t(156) = 3.21, p = .002). The main effect 
of mood and the interaction effect between mood and NFB were not significant (p’s > .60).   
TABLE 10 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NFB AND MEASURES COLLECTED IN PART 2 OF STUDY 4 
 


























Time 2       
NFB  .89  .75****   .49****   .53**** -.49**** -.38**** 
Mood repair tendency .94  .55****   .65****   .28**** -.20* -.22** 
Aversion to negative 
feelings  
.90  .51****   .30****   .62**** -.34**** -.01 
Pleasure from negative 
feelings  
.95 -.49****  -.17*  -.38****   .62****  .10 
Reflection on negative 
feelings 
.93 -.39****  -.13  -.07   .16*  .61**** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. ****p < .001 
 
 Test-Retest Reliability. To assess test-retest reliability, NFB scores from part 1 were 
correlated with NFB scores from part 2 (see table 10). The NFB scale demonstrated acceptable 
test-retest reliability (r = .75, p < .001), providing further support for the stability of the measure.  
6.2.3. Discussion 
 In study 4, I replicated the finding from study 3 that NFB moderates mood repair effects. 
In particular, high-NFB participants were more likely to repair their bad moods than low-NFB 
participants. Similar to the non-significant results from study 3, the TMMS and NMR did not 
moderate people’s tendency to read more uplifting news articles, demonstrating stronger 
predictive validity of the NFB scale over these existing measures. Furthermore, NFB measured 
at time 2 moderated people’s tendency to select happy news. The pattern of interaction that 
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emerged was similar to the one obtained with NFB measured at time 1. Finally, I also examined 
test-retest reliability in the current study and found that test-retest reliability in the current 
student sample was acceptable and similar to that in study 3, providing further evidence of the 





STUDY 5: DOES NFB PREDICT ATTITUDES TOWARD  
MOOD LIFTING ADVERTISEMENT APPEALS? 
 In the previous two studies, I manipulated participants’ mood and examined whether 
chronic levels of NFB would interact with mood to influence their preference for mood lifting 
options. The aim of the current study was to investigate how participants who differ on NFB 
react towards mood lifting advertisement appeals independent of their existing mood states. 
Specifically, I tested whether individuals with high NFB would generally hold more favorable 
attitudes towards messages that emphasize happiness given their chronic motive to maintain a 
positive mood state. Hence, I conducted a single-factor (mood lifting appeal: present vs. absent) 
between-subjects design experiment, with a continuous NFB factor, to test this hypothesis. In 
particular, I examined whether NFB would influence participants’ attitudes towards a product 
depending on the type of ad appeal employed. According to the hypothesis, high-NFB 
participants would have greater preference for the product when the mood lifting appeal is 
present as opposed to absent. It is uncertain whether low-NFB participants would have lower or 
similar preference for the product when the appeal is present (vs. absent). It is possible that 
preference would be lower because low-NFB individuals tend to have a greater desire to focus 
and dwell on negative moods, and may therefore display stronger reactance towards mood lifting 
appeals. It is also possible that there would be no difference in preference because they may 
simply deem the mood lifting appeal to be irrelevant to them.  
7.1. Procedure 
 Four hundred and forty U.S. based participants (264 female; mean age = 38) were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in this study. They were paid $0.10 for 
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their participation in part 1, in which they were asked to fill out the NFB scale (α = .87; α for the 
mood repair tendency subscale = .92; α for aversion to negative feelings subscale = .92; α for 
pleasure from negative feelings subscale = .91; α for reflection on negative feelings subscale = 
.90) as well as some demographic questions. After completing the survey in part 1, participants 
were assigned a qualification in Mechanical Turk which allowed them to participate in part 2 of 
this study that was conducted within a time period of three weeks after part 1.   
 Of the 440 participants who completed the NFB scale in part 1, 176 participants 
completed part 2 (104 female; mean age = 35) in exchange for $0.25. These participants were 
told that the researchers were interested in understanding people’s perceptions of ads and were 
asked to imagine themselves in a scenario in which they were thinking of getting some vitamins 
and came across an advertisement for a vitamin C health supplement. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the mood appeal-absent condition (n = 87) or the mood appeal-present 
condition (n = 89). Those in the appeal-absent condition were exposed to a print ad for a bottle of 
Nutrition Now vitamin C gummies that had a message that focused on the health benefits of 
consuming these vitamins, whereas those in the appeal-present condition saw a print ad for the 
same bottle of vitamins that had a message that focused on the mood benefits of consuming these 
vitamins (see Appendix D for both advertisements). To enhance the mood appeal manipulation, 
the print ad for the appeal-present condition featured a smiley face and brighter colors (i.e., white 
background and orange fonts).  
 After reading the ad in their respective conditions, participants responded to two 
questions about the product they were shown: “Right now, how much would you feel like buying 
this product?” on a 7-point scale where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much, and “Right now, how 
interested are you in finding out more about this product?” on a 7-point scale where 1 = not at all 
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interested and 7 = very interested. Responses on these two items were averaged to form an index 
that constituted that main dependent variable (r = .86). Then, they indicated how much they 
would be willing to pay for a bottle of vitamin Cs (with 100 gummies) from Nutrition Now, and 
rated the extent to which they thought about how the product would improve their health, the 
extent to which they thought about how the product would help them feel happier, whether they 
believed the product would make them healthier, and whether they believed the product would 
make them feel happier on 7-point scales where 1 = not at all and 7 = to a large extent. Following 
that, they answered some covariate questions regarding whether they have heard of Nutrition 
Now and tried its products, their frequency of consuming health supplements, whether they have 
been diagnosed by a doctor with a vitamin C deficiency, and the state of their health. They also 
rated how they felt about consuming vitamin supplements on a 5-point scale where 1 = it is 
unnecessary and 7 = it is necessary, and their agreement with the statement “I make sure that I 
maintain a balanced diet” on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
Finally, before answering the demographic questions, participants rated their mood before they 
did this survey on two different scales where 1 = unpleasant/bad mood and 7 = pleasant/good 
mood (r = .93).  
7.2. Results  
7.2.1. Effect of Appeal Type and NFB on Product Interest 
 Twenty-three participants failed the attention checks and were thus excluded from the 
analyses. It was predicted that, regardless of existing mood, high-NFB participants exposed to 
the mood lifting appeal would be more interested in the product than those exposed to the appeal 
that focused on health benefits, whereas this difference would be either non-significant or 
significant in the reverse direction among low-NFB participants. To test this hypothesis, I 
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submitted the dependent measure to a linear regression analysis with appeal condition (coded as -
1 if absent and 1 if present), mean centered NFB scores from part 1, and their interaction term as 
predictors. Self-reported prior mood that was collected at the end of the survey was also included 
as a covariate. Results showed a significant main effect of the mood appeal such that participants 
in the appeal-present condition were more interested in buying and finding out about the product 
than those in the appeal-absent condition (β = .29, t(148) = 2.11, p = .037). The interaction effect 
was non-significant but directionally consistent with the hypothesis (β = .33, t(148) = 1.46, p = 
.148). After controlling for views concerning the necessity of consuming vitamin supplements 
and whether participants made sure that they maintained a balanced diet, the interaction effect 
held up and became more significant (β = .35, t(146) = 1.61, p = .11; see figure 7). Views 
concerning the necessity of vitamins (β = .39, t(146) = 3.12, p = .002) and tendency to maintain a 
balanced diet (β = -.25, t(146) = -1.89, p = .061) but not self-reported prior mood (β = -.06, 
t(146) = -.58, p = .564) affected participants’ interest to buy and find out more about the product.  
 A spotlight analysis controlling for these two covariates and prior mood revealed that 
among participants with high NFB (+1 SD above the sample mean), those in the appeal-present 
condition were more interested in buying and finding out about the product compared to those in 
the appeal-absent condition (β = .55, t(146) = 2.86, p = .005). Among participants with low NFB 
(-1 SD below the sample mean), the same difference was not significant (β = .11, t(146) = .55, p 
= .582). This provides some preliminary evidence that the NFB scale may predict the 
effectiveness of mood lifting appeals. Additionally, there was no evidence that low-NFB 
participants have more reactance toward products marketed using mood lifting appeals. 
Submitting the amount of money participants were willing to pay for the product to the same 




STUDY 5: THE EFFECT OF TYPE OF ADVERTISEMENT APPEAL AND NFB ON INTEREST TO BUY AND 




7.2.2. Effect of Appeal Type and NFB on Consideration of Health versus Mood Benefits 
  The extent to which participants thought about how the product would help them feel 
happier was submitted to the same linear regression analysis. There was no significant effect of 
self-reported prior mood (β = .04, t(148) = .37, p = .709). Results indicated a significant main 
effect of appeal condition such that participants those exposed to the mood lifting appeal 
considered how the product would help them feel happier to a greater extent than those exposed 
to the other appeal (β = .58, t(148) = 4.20, p < .001), demonstrating that the appeal manipulation 
was successful. In addition, there was a significant interaction effect (β = .60, t(148) = 2.68, p = 
.008): the simple main effect of appeal was significant among high-NFB participants (β = .96, 
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words, high-NFB participants were more likely to consider how the vitamins C product would 
lift their mood. I regressed the same predictors on the extent to which participants thought about 
how the product would improve their health. There were no significant main effects of the appeal 
manipulation (β = .16, t(148) = 1.38, p = .17) and NFB (β = .28, t(148) = 1.46, p = .15). The 
interaction effect between the appeal manipulation and NFB was also not significant (β = -.04, 
t(148) = -.23, p = .817). 
 Submitting participants’ expectancies of whether the product would help them feel 
happier also led to similar results. Type of appeal (β = .13, t(148) = 1.01, p = .312) and self-
reported prior mood (β = -.04, t(148) = -.44, p = .664) did not have significant effects on 
participants’ expectancies of mood benefits. There was a significant interaction between type of 
appeal and NFB (β = .54, t(148) = 2.49, p = .014) such that the simple main effect of appeal was 
significant among high-NFB participants (β = .48, t(148) = 2.51, p = .013) but not low-NFB 
participants (β = -.21, t(148) = -1.11, p = .268). Hence, high-NFB participants were more likely 
to believe that the vitamins C product would help them feel happier. There were no significant 
main effects of the appeal condition (β = .02, t(148) = .17, p =.866) and NFB (β = .07, t(148) = 
.36, p = .722) on participants’ expectancies of whether the product would improve their health. 
The interaction effect between the appeal condition and NFB was also not significant (β = .08, 
t(148) = .41, p = .68). 
7.2.3. Mediation of Product Interest by Consideration of Mood Benefits 
 To test whether high-NFB participants were more interested in the vitamin C gummies 
because of the mood lifting appeal, I ran a moderated mediation with 5,000 bootstrapped samples 
using model 8 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS with views concerning the necessity of 
consuming vitamin supplements and whether participants made sure that they maintained a 
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balanced diet as covariates and the extent to which they thought about how the product could 
help them feel happier as a mediator on their interest in buying and finding out more the product 
(Hayes 2013). Results indicated a significant moderated mediation for product interest (β = .31, 
with a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval that does not include 0 {.1115, .5944}). More 
specifically, among the high-NFB participants, consideration about the mood lifting properties 
about the product mediated the effect of type of appeal on product interest (β = .49 with a bias-
corrected 95% confidence interval that excludes 0 {.2662, .7883}). However, among the low-
NFB participants, there was no mediation (β = .11, with a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval 
that contains 0 {-.0959, .3073}).  
 The same analysis was conducted using participants’ expectancies of whether the product 
would help them feel happier as the mediator. There was a significant moderated mediation for 
product interest (β = .27, with a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval that does not include 0 
{.0717, .5375}). Among the high-NFB participants, believing that the product would help them 
feel happier mediated the effect of type of appeal on product interest (β = .22 with a bias-
corrected 95% confidence interval that excludes 0 {.0360, .4547}). However, among the low-
NFB participants, type of appeal did not mediate product interest (β = -.12, with a bias-corrected 
95% confidence interval that contains 0 {-.3148, .0549}). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that high-NFB participants were more interested in the product because of the perceived mood-
lifting properties of the product.  
 
7.3. Discussion  
 Study 5 aimed to investigate how participants who differ on NFB react towards mood 
lifting advertisement appeals irrespective of their existing mood states. It was predicted that 
individuals with high NFB would generally have more favorable attitudes towards messages that 
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emphasize happiness given their chronic tendency to maintain a positive mood state, whereas 
individuals with low NFB would display either less favorable or indifferent attitudes towards 
such appeals. Although the critical interaction between type of appeal and NFB did not reach 
significance, its pattern of the interaction was directionally consistent with my hypothesis. 
Subsequent spotlight analyses also revealed that high-NFB participants displayed stronger 
interest in the product when the appeal emphasized mood lifting benefits as opposed to health 
benefits. The same contrast was not significant among low-NFB participants, suggesting that in 
general individuals with low need to engage in mood repair have no reactance towards ads that 
tout mood benefits.2
 In summary, preliminary results from study 5 suggest that NFB can influence people’s 
preferences for mood lifting options independent of their existing mood states. In particular, 
people with higher NFB tend to show greater interest in products that are marketed as providing 
some mood lifting benefits. The story is somewhat more complicated for people with low NFB: 
these individuals are generally indifferent toward mood lifting appeals but seem to display some 
reactance toward such appeals when they experience negative moods (refer to footnote 1 and 
figure 8). By and large, individuals with low NFB may deem messages that tout mood benefits as 
  
                                                          
2 To test whether there would be reactance against the mood lifting appeal when low-NFB participants 
experienced prior negative mood states, I ran a three-way interaction analysis with type of appeal, NFB, 
prior mood and their interaction terms as predictors on participants’ interest to buy and find out more 
about the product. I included views about the necessity of vitamins and tendency to maintain a balanced 
diet as covariates in this regression. According to the results, there was a significant three-way interaction 
(β = .40, t(143) = 2.69, p = .008; see figure 8). Further examination of this interaction pattern revealed 
that among low-NFB participants, there was a significant simple two-way interaction between type of 
appeal and self-reported prior mood on product interest (β = -.29, t(143) = -1.99, p = .048), which was 
driven by a significant simple simple main effect of prior mood among low-NFB participants when the 
mood lifting appeal was present (β = -.36, t(143) = -2.11, p = .036). In other words, when the appeal 
emphasized happiness, the more negative low-NFB participants’ prior moods were, the less interest 
(possibly more reactance) they had in the product. The same simple two-way interaction was not 
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irrelevant. However, when they experience negative mood, they may consider such appeals as 
incompatible with their desire to focus and dwell on their negative mood. Nonetheless, current 
findings pertaining to participants’ prior mood must be interpreted with caution because these 

















































to the advertisements and responses on the survey measures. In fact, unlike in previous studies 
where a mood repair effect was observed among high-NFB participants, there was no 
enhancement of interest in the product when mood was relatively more unpleasant among high-
NFB participants who were shown the mood lifting ad appeal. Future studies should seek to 
replicate these findings by manipulating mood or using measures of pre-existing mood states that 





STUDY 6: DOES NFB PREDICT MOOD REPAIR VIA  
INDULGENCE IN SNACKS? 
 Studies in marketing have demonstrated that people tend to increase their consumption of 
fattening, unhealthy foods in response to negative mood states (Garg, Wansink, and Inman, 
2007; Garner, Wansink, Kim, and Park 2014). The prevailing theory is that individuals engage in 
emotional eating to alleviate themselves from aversive negative mood states (Andrade 2005; 
Garg et al. 2007; Labroo and Anirban Mukhopadhyay 2009; Tice et al. 2001). The underlying 
premise for this theory is that food, especially ones with high caloric and sugar content, acts as a 
mood regulator, enhancing people’s current affective state after intake (Morris and Reilly 1987; 
Polivy and Herman 1976). Providing support for this theory, studies have shown that this effect 
is attenuated when people do not perceive unhealthy snacks as mood-lifting (Andrade 2005; Tice 
et al. 2001), and when negative moods are perceived as transient states that need not be regulated 
(Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009).  
 The purpose of the current study was to test the predictive validity of the NFB scale by 
examining whether it increases people’s tendency to indulge in unhealthy snacks when they 
experience negative mood. I ran a single-factor between subjects lab experiment at Columbia 
University in which participants were asked to provide their responses to the NFB scale in an 
online survey before coming to the lab, and were induced with negative (versus neutral) mood 
and received snack foods in a sham taste test during the lab session. This taste-rating paradigm is 
often used as a method to unobtrusively measure food consumption in the lab (e.g., Tice et al. 
2001; Heatherton, Striepe and Wittenberg 1998). I hypothesized that among participants with 
higher NFB, those induced with negative mood would eat a greater quantity of snacks compared 
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to those induced with neutral mood; this difference would not be significant among participants 
with low NFB.  
 To verify that participants do regard eating as a strategy to improve their mood, I 
conducted a pilot test (N = 74) in which I collected Columbia students’ responses on the NFB 
and asked them several questions regarding their use of certain strategies to accomplish different 
goals (e.g., “I buy new gym wear to make myself exercise”). I included the following questions 
on mood regulation goals: “When I want to feel more positive emotion, I eat foods that I would 
enjoy eating,” “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I eat foods that I would enjoy eating,” 
and “I try to improve my mood by eating chocolate.” Participants responded to these items on a 
likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Ratings on the first two questions 
were averaged (r = .70). I found that people with higher scores on our NFB scale tend to eat 
foods that they would enjoy eating to repair their mood (r = .37, p < .005). Further, they were 
also more likely to report improving their mood by eating chocolate (r = .27, p < .05). Hence, 
indulging in food is a mood regulation strategy that is relevant to Columbia students. 
8.1. Procedure 
 One hundred and thirty-seven participants (85 female; mean age = 22) were recruited 
from Columbia Business School’s behavioral lab panel to participate in this study for $5. Before 
coming to the lab session, they answered an online survey that contained the NFB scale (α = 
.89). To disguise the intent of the study, other scales that do not pertain to affect-related 
constructs (i.e., the style of processing scale [Childers, Houston, and Heckler 1985]; material 
values scale [Richins 2004]; and need for cognition scale [Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao 1984] were 
included alongside the NFB scale. There were no significant correlations between these scales 
and the NFB scale. Participants were told that the purpose of these questionnaires was to 
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understand the profile of participants who participate in studies at the behavioral lab on a regular 
basis. Upon coming to the lab, participants were then randomly assigned to either a negative (n = 
68) or neutral mood (n = 69) condition. They were told that they would be participating in 
several unrelated studies by different professors at the business school.  
 In the first part of the lab session, participants completed the same mood manipulation 
task that was employed in study 3. After this task, participants rated their current mood as a 
manipulation check on two 7-point bipolar scales where 1= unpleasant/bad mood and 7= 
pleasant/good mood. These scores were averaged to form a mood index (r = .81). Then, they 
proceeded to perform the taste test. They were told that the taste test was a pilot study on 
differences among people in the perception and taste of various kinds of foods. They were then 
presented three kinds of snacks (i.e., pretzels, chocolate chip cookies, and small cheese 
“goldfish” crackers) in separate plates, and were asked to fill out a questionnaire rating each of 
these snacks on how sweet, salty, bitter, sour, tasty, appetizing, oily they are. Using three 
different snacks would cater to individual taste preferences and enhance the realism of the taste 
test. Participants were specifically instructed to take as much as they needed to rate the taste of 
each snack food, and were encouraged to help themselves to the leftover snacks that would 
otherwise be thrown out at the end of the study. Unbeknownst to the participants, the amount of 
each snack food was counted before and after the taste test. The quantity of snack foods 
consumed by each participant constituted the key dependent measure.  
 After the taste test, participants filled out another survey that included questions about 
their current mood (r = .88), demographics, liking for each snack food, and frequency of eating 
snacks in general. The survey also included covariate measures such as how hungry or full they 
felt before the study, the time of their last meal, whether they exercised before the session, 
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whether they were currently on a diet, whether they were currently feeling unwell, how health 
conscious they are, and the extent to which they avoid eating snacks in general. Participants also 
filled out the Dieting Restraint Scale (Herman and Polivy 1975), and questions about the extent 
to which they restricted their intake of snacks in the taste test and the extent to which they 
thought eating can improve their mood. Participants were able to consume the snacks foods as 
they were filling out the survey.  
8.2. Results  
8.2.1. Manipulation Check 
 Fifteen participants failed the attention check and were thus removed from the sample. 
Responses on the manipulation check questions were submitted to a linear regression analysis 
with mood condition (coded as -1 if negative and 1 if neutral), mean centered NFB scores from 
the online survey, and their interaction term as predictors. Results indicated a significant main 
effect of the mood condition such that participants in the negative mood condition experienced 
more unpleasant and bad mood (M = 3.39) compared to the participants in the neutral mood 
condition (M = 4.68) after the mood manipulation (t(116) = 5.43, p < .001; there were two 
missing responses on the manipulation check). The main effect of NFB and interaction effect 
between the mood condition and NFB were not significant.    
8.2.2. Amount of Snacks Eaten 
 The number of pretzels, cookies and crackers were counted before and after the taste test. 
The amount of snack foods each participant consumed was therefore calculated using 
subtraction. Because the three snack foods differed in size and there was especially high variance 
in the number of crackers people ate, amounts eaten for each snack food were standardized and 
the three z-scores for each participant were summed to create an index of total amount of food 
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consumed. This is in line with procedures employed by Tice et al. (2001). A t-test showed a 
directionally consistent but nonsignificant effect of negative mood on this index score (Mnegmood 
= .22 vs. Mneumood = -.32; t(120) = 1.28, p = .202).  
 Index scores were submitted to a linear regression with mood condition (coded as -1 if 
negative and 1 if neutral), mean centered NFB scores from the online survey, and their 
interaction term as predictors. Contrary to my prediction that NFB would moderate the effect of 
mood on amount of snack foods eaten, there was no significant interaction effect between NFB 
and mood condition (β = .25, t(118) = .25, p = .417). There were also no significant main effects 
of mood (β = -1.31, t(118) = -1.02, p = .311) and NFB (β = -.19, t(118) = -.63, p = .532). 
Controlling for the covariates measured in this study did not make a difference to the 
significance of the results.  
 The same analysis was performed using each of the individual NFB subscales as 
moderators. Results indicated a significant moderating effect of the pleasure from negative 
feelings subscale on the total amount of snack foods consumed (β = -.51, t(118) = -2.04, p = 
.044; see figure 9, upper panel). A subsequent spotlight analysis revealed that among participants 
with high pleasure from negative feelings (+1 SD above the sample mean), those induced with 
negative mood consumed more snacks than those induced with neutral mood (β = -.72, t(118) = -
2.40, p = .018). Among those with low pleasure from negative feelings (-1 SD below the sample 
mean), there was no significant difference in amount of snacks consumed across the two mood 
conditions (β = .15, t(118) = .49, p = .622). In addition, there was a significant moderating effect 
of the reflection on negative feelings subscale on the total amount of snack foods consumed (β = 
-.46, t(118) = -2.10, p = .038; see figure 9, lower panel). More specifically, among participants 
with high reflection on negative feelings (+1 SD above the sample mean), those induced with 
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negative mood consumed more snacks than those induced with neutral mood (β = -.71, t(118) = -
2.37, p = .02). However, among participants with low reflection on negative feelings (-1 SD 
below the sample mean), there was no significant effect of mood on amount of snacks consumed 
  
FIGURE 9 
STUDY 6: THE EFFECT OF MOOD CONDITION AND NFB SUBSCALES (UPPER PANEL: PLEASURE 
FROM NEGATIVE FEELINGS; LOWER PANEL: REFLECTION ON NEGATIVE FEELINGS) ON INDEX OF 
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(β = .19, t(118) = .62, p = .539). Neither the mood repair tendency subscale nor the aversion 
toward negative feelings subscale moderated the effect of mood on total amount of snacks 
consumed. 
 Additional moderation analyses were run to check whether the current set of data would 
replicate mood repair findings that have been documented in the literature. Based on past 
research (e.g., Andrade 2005) suggesting that females might be more susceptible to emotional 
eating than males, I ran the same analysis to examine whether gender would moderate the effect 
of mood on amount of snacks eaten. Results indicated a significant interaction between gender 
and mood condition on total amount of snacks consumed (β = 1.38, t(118) = 3.25, p = .002). 
However, contrary to past research, negative mood significantly increased eating behavior 
among males (β = -1.13, t(118) = -3.37, p = .001) but not females (β = .25, t(118) = .96, p = 
.341). The same analysis was also run to check if the extent to which participants thought eating 
could improve their mood would moderate the effect of mood on amount of snacks eaten. There 
were no significant effects. This is surprising in light of previous work (e.g., Tice et al. 2001) 
that suggests that mood repair using a particular strategy is more likely to take place when people 
expect that strategy to be effective in lifting one’s mood. Nonetheless, this item was measured 
towards the end of the survey and may have been influenced by the taste test and the other 
questions being asked in the survey. Finally, I did not find participants’ scores on the dieting 
restraint scale to moderate the effect of mood on amount of snacks eaten in the taste test, in line 
with findings in the extant literature (Tice et al. 2001; Yeomans and Coughlan 2008).  
8.2.3. Mood Improvement  
 To test whether mood improved after participants ate more snacks, I computed a mood 
improvement score by subtracting mood measured after the manipulation task from mood 
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measured immediately after the taste test (before participants filled out the final survey). To test 
whether participants who tend to gain more pleasure from negative feelings in the negative mood 
condition were more likely to experience mood improvement following the taste test, mood 
improvement scores were regressed on mood condition, mean-centered pleasure from negative 
feelings scores, and their interaction term. There were no significant results from this analysis 
(interaction: β = -.09, t(118) = -.71, p = .478).  
 The same regression was run with mean centered reflection on negative feelings scores as 
the moderator. In this case, there was a marginally significant interaction between the mood 
condition and reflection on negative feelings on mood improvement (β = -.21, t(118) = -1.81, p = 
.074). A subsequent spotlight analysis revealed that among participants with high reflection on 
negative feelings (+1 SD above the sample mean), those induced with negative mood 
experienced more improvement in mood than those induced with neutral mood (β = -.59, t(118) 
= -3.79, p < .001). However, among participants with low reflection on negative feelings (-1 SD 
below the sample mean), there was no significant effect of mood on mood improvement (β = -
.19, t(118) = -1.18, p = .241).  
 Given the significant interaction effect between the mood condition and the reflection on 
negative feelings subscale, I tested whether the consumption of snacks mediated the mood 
improvement experienced by participants in the negative mood condition with high reflection on 
negative feelings. I ran a moderated mediation with 5,000 bootstrapped samples using model 7 of 
the PROCESS macro for SPSS on total amount of snacks eaten (Hayes, 2013). Results indicated 
a significant moderated mediation for the amount of snacks eaten (β = -.07, with a bias-corrected 
95% confidence interval that does not include 0 {-.1922, -.0011}). More specifically, among 
participants with high reflection on negative feelings, amount of snacks eaten mediated the effect 
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of negative mood on mood improvement (β = -.11 with a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval 
that excludes 0 {-.2633, -.0221}). However, among participants with low reflection on negative 
feelings, amount of snacks eaten did not mediate the effect of negative mood on mood 
improvement (β = .03, with a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval that contains 0 {-.0677, 
.1646}). Hence, these findings suggest that participants in the negative mood condition with 
chronic tendency to reflect on their negative mood were more likely to experience improvement 
in their mood because of their increased consumption of snacks.  
8.3. Discussion 
 Engaging in pleasurable eating is a common mood regulation strategy (Thayer et al. 
1994), and it has been shown in the literature that people tend to select indulgent food or increase 
their consumption of such foods under inductions of negative mood, particularly in the service of 
up-regulating their mood state (e.g., Garg et al. 2007, Tice et al. 2001). The aim of the present 
study was to demonstrate that the NFB scale is predictive of people’s regulatory eating patterns 
when they experience negative mood. Specifically, it was hypothesized that, compared to a 
control condition, negative mood would encourage consumption of snacks, and that this effect 
would be magnified among participants with higher NFB levels. Contrary to this prediction, the 
NFB full scale did not moderate the expected mood repair effect, which was only directionally 
consistent and not significant in the current sample.  
 Investigating moderating effects using the various subscales of NFB led to surprising 
findings. It was found that higher scores on both the pleasure from negative feelings and 
reflection on negative feelings subscales (which corresponds to lower scores on the NFB full 
scale) predicted greater eating patterns among participants in the negative (vs. neutral) mood 
condition. In other words, people who tend to find comfort and dwell in their negative feelings as 
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well as those who tend to focus and deliberate over the root causes of their negative feelings 
consumed more snacks when they were induced with negative mood. Clearly, there are 
numerous goals and unconscious motives that may influence eating behavior. Hence, it is 
uncertain whether these individuals were indeed consuming these snacks with the specific goal 
of lifting their mood. Nonetheless, participants with high reflection on negative feelings 
experienced significant mood improvement after consuming more snacks.  
 There are several possible explanations for these findings. First, participants who score 
higher on these two subscales might have been more involved in the taste test given that 
assessing the taste of different foods is a highly introspective task that would be compatible with 
the introspective mindsets that these individuals tend to have. Thus, they might have spent more 
time savoring the food and ended up eating more snacks. To test if this is true, I computed 
standard deviations scores for participants’ taste ratings (within snacks, within types of tastes, 
and across different snacks and tastes) to examine if there was greater variance among 
participants with higher pleasure from negative feelings and reflection on negative feelings 
scores. Apart from a weak positive correlation between reflection on negative feelings and 
standard deviation scores among the appetizing items across the three different kinds of snacks (r 
= .21, p = .021), there was no indication of greater variance in tastes among participants who 
tend to derive more pleasure and reflect more on their negative feelings. Nevertheless, the lack of 
significant findings is insufficient to rule out this possible explanation.  
 Another possible reason why participants who tend to derive pleasure from negative 
mood states ate more snacks in the negative mood condition is because these individuals 
perceived eating junk food as an opportunity to prolong the duration of their negative feelings. 
Stated differently, they may have viewed indulging in snacks as a chance to engage in self-pity 
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or to experience guilt from overeating. Correlational analyses performed on the current data 
revealed a significant positive correlation between pleasure from negative feelings and 
participants scores on the dieting restraint scale (r = .20, p = .031; in particular, participants who 
gain more pleasure from negative feelings are more likely to report having feelings of guilt after 
overeating, r = .22, p = .016, giving too much time and thought to food, r = .22, p = .016, and 
dieting more frequently, r = .18, p = .053). An independent t-test also showed that participants 
who stated that they were currently on a diet possess higher pleasure from negative feelings 
scores (n = 14, M = 2.50) than those who were not currently on a diet (n = 107, M = 1.85, t(119) 
= 2.73, p = .007). Initial indulgence in snacks during the taste test might have also led these 
individuals to perceive continued restraint as a lost cause and thus increase their eating behavior, 
a phenomenon commonly known as the what-the-hell-effect (Polivy and Herman 1985). 
 A third explanation of why participants who scored high on both the pleasure and 
reflection subscales consumed more snacks in a negative mood pertains to self-control failure. It 
is plausible that these individuals experienced greater depletion from the negative mood 
induction given their stronger propensity to dwell and ponder over their negative feelings. This 
might have in turn compromised their ability to monitor their consumption and led to 
disinhibited, automatic eating. Higher cognitive load from focusing on their negative feelings 
might have also caused them to crave for snack foods which are typically perceived as “quick 
energy products” and “treats” (Oliver and Wardle 1999).   
 Although these results are somewhat surprising and it is unclear at the moment what 
forces are driving them, it is noteworthy that they are consistent with past findings on depression 
in the clinical psychology literature. For example, it has been found that individuals with 
depression (vs. non-depressed controls) are likely to consume more food in a negative mood 
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(Dingemans, Martijn, van Furth, and Jansen 2009). Furthermore, tendency to ruminate in 
response to depressed mood has also been linked to eating disordered pathology over and above 
the impact of emotional distress (Gilboa-Schechtman, Avnon, Zubery, and Jeczmien 2006). In 
my dissertation, I have found pleasure from negative feelings and reflection on negative feelings 
to have significant positive associations with depressive symptoms. Further investigation of the 
current findings and their underlying mechanisms may help uncover psychological factors that 
account for the relationship between depression and disordered eating patterns.  
 One limitation of the current study was that participants received snacks as part of a taste 
test. Hence, they might have viewed the behavior of eating snacks as pursuing an instrumental 
(vs. pleasurable) goal. Nonetheless, past research on emotional eating (e.g., Dingemans et al. 
2009; Tice et al. 2001; Yeomans and Coughlan 2008) has employed the same paradigm to 
measure mood repair through indulgence in fattening, unhealthy foods. However, unlike in past 
research, I did not allot a specific duration for the taste test. In other words, participants could 
spend as much or as little time they desired to complete the taste test. Future replications of this 
study should include another cover story that does not entail pursuit of an instrumental goal, or 
fully replicate the procedure used by previous work (i.e., fix a reasonable duration for the taste 
test across both mood conditions).  
 The emergence of the significant moderations of pleasure from negative feelings and 
reflection on negative feelings on the effect of negative mood on snack consumption suggest that 
the psychological mechanisms, which mediate the effect of negative mood on eating behavior, 
may be more complicated than previously thought. Although these results are intriguing, it 
remains uncertain whether these are robust findings. Future replications are therefore needed to 




STUDY 7: DOES NFB PREDICT MOOD REPAIR VIA  
UNPLANNED PURCHASING BEHAVIOR? 
 “Shopping has always been a form of therapy.” (Paco Underhill in Lanier, 2005, p. 175) 
 As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, there appears to be a popular lay 
belief that shopping is a form of retail therapy. Shoppers often explicitly relate shopping to 
negative affect (Rook 1987), and engage in self-gifting behaviors to cheer themselves up or 
reward themselves (Mick and Demoss 1990). Shoppers also engage in impulse shopping when 
they experience certain moods. Impulse shopping, or immediate buying behavior in response to a 
sudden and potent urge that arises within the consumer (Beatty and Ferrell 1998; Rook 1987), is 
spontaneous and reflects a desire to buy without rational consideration of why the consumer 
should have the product (Rook 1987; Rook and Fisher 1995). In qualitative research, respondents 
commonly mention the presence of positive mood states like being excited or carefree before 
they make an impulse purchase (Rook and Gardner 1993). Impulse shopping also commonly 
takes place when people experience negative mood, likely as an attempt to alleviate the 
unpleasant mood (Elliott 1994; O’Guinn and Faber 1989; Rook and Gardner 1993). 
 The present study seeks to investigate how NFB is associated with real world shopping 
behavior. Given that one way to repair one’s mood is through retail therapy, people with high 
NFB may be more likely to purchase self-treats that are unplanned. To investigate this 
possibility, I ran a field study at a supermarket in which shoppers who completed their shopping 
were approached. In addition to filling out the NFB scale, shoppers who agreed to participate in 
this study were asked to categorize each of the products they purchased as being planned, 
spontaneous, etc. I hypothesized that NFB would be positively associated with spontaneous 
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purchases. Shoppers were also asked to report how positive or negative their prior mood was. 
Hence, I was able to test whether prior mood interacted with shoppers’ NFB levels to determine 
shopping behavior.    
9.1. Procedure 
 Shoppers who had made purchases were recruited near the check-out counters of Morton 
Williams, a mid-size supermarket (about 5,000 square feet) located across the street from 
Columbia University. In order to reduce any extraneous factors that may influence the results, 
people shopping in pairs or groups and people shopping with children were not sampled. 
Shoppers were recruited across a variety of time periods over a one-month period. They were 
told that the researchers were interested in shopping behavior among grocery store shoppers at 
Morton Williams and were asked if they would like to participate in a 5-minute survey in 
exchange for a snack of their choice. There were four snack choices, two of which were 
relatively healthier (a mixed fruits snack and a granola bar) than the other two (peanut butter 
cups and chocolate candies). A total of 111 shoppers agreed to participate in this study (72 
female; mean age = 31).  
 Once participants agreed to participate, the research assistant told them that there were 
different types of purchases that people tended to make. In particular, the items people buy can 
be classified under each of the following categories: 1) Planned purchase – something they knew 
they would be buying before entering the store; 2) Recalled purchase – something they did not 
plan to buy in advance, but they remembered that they needed or wanted to buy when they were 
already in the store; 3) Spontaneous purchase – something they bought spontaneously while they 
were shopping; 4) Goal-related purchase – something they bought for a particular reason or goal 
that they knew before entering the store (e.g., thirsty, lunch, something sweet, etc.), but only 
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figured out what to buy when they were already in the store; 5) Other purchase – something that 
does not fit into the above categories (e.g., gift, substitute, etc.).  The research assistant reviewed 
each of these categories and their definitions with participants. Then, he asked participants for 
their receipts and reviewed each item on the receipt with them. Participants classified each of the 
items they purchased into one of these categories. (NB: The goal-related purchase category was 
included subsequently after the study had begun running. Hence, data with respect to this 
category is available for only 96 participants.) 
 Participants additionally filled out a short survey which included questions concerning 
their mood before entering the store that day, their satisfaction with the shopping experience, 
whether their mindset while they were shopping was leisurely or rushed, whether they were 
shopping for themselves or others, the last time they had their meal, and how much they 
generally enjoyed shopping. Prior mood before shopping was rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = 
very bad and 7 = very good, whereas satisfaction and general enjoyment of shopping were rated 
on a 7-point scale where 1 = not at all and 7 = very/very much. The survey also included 
demographic questions and questions regarding their patronage and shopping frequency at 
Morton Williams, as well as the complete NFB scale. To control for potential order effects that 
could bias participants’ responses, the research assistant counterbalanced the order of the 
classification task and the survey. After participants completed both parts, they made their snack 
choice and were thanked for their participation in the study. 
9.2. Results 
 Based on participants’ receipts, I was able to obtain information about the date and time 
that the purchases were made, the total number of items that were purchased and the total 
expenditure. The number of items classified in each category and the proportion of total items 
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that fell into each category was computed for each participant. The key dependent measures were 
the number and proportion of items that were categorized as spontaneous purchases.  
9.2.1. Preliminary Analyses 
 Correlational analyses conducted among the NFB, its subscales, prior mood, satisfaction 
and general enjoyment of shopping revealed significant results (see table 11). Specifically, NFB 
was marginally correlated with prior mood such that higher NFB was associated with better 
mood (r = .17, p = .071). NFB was also positively associated with shopping satisfaction (r = .24, 
p = .013); people with higher NFB tended to experience more satisfaction while shopping. I also 
replicated my previous finding that people with higher NFB tend to derive more enjoyment from 
shopping (r = .20, p = .032). Significant results also emerged from correlational analyses 
conducted between three of these survey measures and participants’ purchase data. In particular, 
prior mood was negatively associated with the number (r = -.20, p = .035) and proportion of 
spontaneous purchases (r = -.18, p = .064) that participants made. In other words, more negative 
mood was related to greater number of spontaneous purchases, which suggests the possibility 
that participants were buying more spontaneous purchases in response to bad mood. Shopping 
satisfaction was also negatively associated with the number (r = -.26, p = .007) and proportion of 
spontaneous purchases (r = -.30, p = .001) that participants made. Furthermore, I found that prior 
mood was positively associated with the number (r = .20, p = .047) and proportion of goal-
related purchases (r = .27, p = .008) that participants made, and satisfaction was positively 
associated with proportion of planned purchases made (r = .19, p = .048). Finally, NFB did not 
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 Prior Mood  Satisfaction  Enjoy shopping 
NFB    .17*      .24**      .20** 
Mood repair tendency         .28****         .32****         .27**** 
Aversion to negative feelings  .10    .18*    .18* 
Pleasure from negative feelings -.09 -.07  .00 
Reflection on negative feelings  .00 -.05 -.10 
Number of planned purchases -.04    .07 -.03  
Number of recalled purchases  .07  -.02  -.04  
Number of spontaneous purchases    -.20**       -.26***   .02  
Number of goal-related purchases     .20** -.04  .13  
Number of other purchases -.10   .00  -.08  
Proportion of planned purchases -.09       .19**  -.10  
Proportion of recalled purchases  .07  -.07  -.05  
Proportion of spontaneous purchases  -.18*         -.30****    .01  
Proportion of goal-related purchases       .27***   .08    .17  
Proportion of other purchases -.08    .02   -.10  
Total number of purchases -.06  -.07    .01  
Total expenditure  .03  -.07    .02 
NOTE.—Controlling for the order in which the categorization task and survey was conducted did not 
significantly affect the strength of the correlations reported in this table. 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .005. 
 
9.2.2. Main Analyses  
 Based on my hypothesis, I expected people with higher NFB to make more spontaneous 
purchases. To test this hypothesis, correlational analyses were conducted between NFB (and its 
subscales) and the number and proportion of items falling into each category, as well as total 
number of items purchased and amount of expenditure (see table 12). Contrary to my prediction, 
NFB was negatively associated with the number (r = -.24, p = .011) and proportion of 
spontaneous purchases made (r = -.27, p = .004); people with high NFB bought fewer rather than 
more items spontaneously. Interestingly, results also showed that NFB was positively correlated 
with number (r = .22, p = .032) and proportion of goal-related purchases made (r = .26, p = 
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.011). In other words, people with higher NFB were more likely to enter the store with specific 
goals but not items in mind, and make their purchase decisions upon entering the store. These 
significant findings held up even after controlling for order in which the categorization task and 
survey were conducted, as well as other measures in the survey including prior mood, 
satisfaction and general enjoyment of shopping. There were no significant relationships between 
NFB and the other types of items, total number of items purchased and expenditure. 3
TABLE 12 
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Number of planned purchases       .06  -.08  .13 -.06 -.03 
Number of recalled purchases     -.05  -.12 -.04 -.12  .10 
Number of spontaneous purchases     -.24**   -.18* -.12  .09      .22** 
Number of goal-related purchases      .22**      .23** -.01    -.21** -.17 
Number of other purchases     -.03  -.02 -.03 -.10  .07 
Proportion of planned purchases       .05  -.01  .10  .10 -.10 
Proportion of recalled purchases     -.05 -.10 -.03 -.11  .11 
Proportion of spontaneous purchases     -.27****     -.21** -.10  .14    .23* 
Proportion of goal-related purchases .26**        .28***  .00    -.25** -.16 
Proportion of other purchases     -.02 -.10  .00 -.05  .07 
Total number of purchases     -.01 -.11  .04 -.09  .05 
Total expenditure     -.08 -.11 -.05 -.06  .08 
NOTE.—Controlling for the order in which the categorization task and survey was conducted did not significantly 
affect the strength of the correlations reported in this table. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .005. 
                                                          
3 To investigate whether the pleasurable nature of the spontaneous purchases would influence participants’ shopping 
behavior, two independent raters classified each product participants purchased as “hedonic,” “utilitarian,” or “either 
hedonic or utilitarian” (e.g., unspecified grocery items; Kappa = .72; disagreements were resolved through 
discussion).  Hedonic products (e.g., chocolates, flavored soda) are those that are consumed primarily for pleasure 
and sensory enjoyment, whereas utilitarian products (e.g., skim milk, painkillers) are those that are used to attain 
practical or instrumental goals (Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). The number of hedonic purchases as well as the 
number of hedonic purchases that were spontaneously acquired was computed for each participant. Correlational 
analyses revealed non-significant correlations between NFB and number of hedonic purchases (r = -.04, p = .716), 
and between NFB and number of purchases that were both hedonic and spontaneous (r = -.14, p = .177). Regression 
analyses using NFB, prior mood and their interaction term as predictors did not lead to any significant findings. (The 
same set of analyses using utilitarian purchases as the dependent variable also led to null results.) 
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 To investigate whether NFB interacted with prior mood to influence participants’ 
purchasing behavior, I ran a regression analysis including mean-centered NFB, mean-centered 
prior mood and their interaction term as predictors as well as order of categorization task and 
survey, satisfaction and general enjoyment of shopping as covariates on the various purchase 
measures. I obtained significant effects on the number of spontaneous items shoppers purchased. 
In particular, there was a marginally significant main effect of NFB (β = -.35, t(102) = -1.95, p = 
.055) and a significant main effect of prior mood (β = -.21, t(102) = -2.20, p = .03) that was 
qualified by a marginally significant interaction effect between prior mood and NFB (β = .24, 
t(102) = 1.92, p = .057; see figure 10). Subsequent spotlight analyses conducted at +1 SD above 
the sample mean of NFB and -1 SD below the sample mean of NFB demonstrated that among 
shoppers with high NFB, there was no significant effect of prior mood on number of spontaneous 
purchases (β = -.06, t(102) = -.48, p = .63). However, among shoppers with low NFB (-1 SD 
below the sample mean), there was a significant effect of prior mood such that shoppers who 
were experiencing poorer moods purchased more spontaneous items (β = -.37, t(102) = -2.78, p = 
.007).   
 The same regression analysis conducted with mean-centered aversion to negative feelings 
scores instead of mean-centered NFB scores led to similar effects on number of spontaneous 
purchases. A significant interaction effect between prior mood and NFB emerged (β = .16, t(102) 
= 2.31, p = .023). Subsequent spotlight analyses conducted at +1 SD above the sample mean of 
aversion to negative feelings and -1 SD below the sample mean of aversion to negative feelings 
demonstrated that among shoppers with high aversion to feelings, there was no significant effect 
of prior mood on number of spontaneous purchases (β = -.01, t(102) = -.11, p = .914). However, 
among shoppers with low aversion to negative feelings (-1 SD below the sample mean), there 
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was a significant effect of prior mood such that shoppers who were experiencing poorer moods 
purchased more spontaneous items (β = -.40, t(102) = -3.13, p = .002). Hence, the pattern of the 
interaction effect between prior mood and aversion to negative feelings was similar to that 
between prior mood and NFB. Interestingly, shoppers who had lower NFB, in particular aversion 
to negative feelings, were more likely to purchase items spontaneously when they experienced 
relatively poorer moods.   
FIGURE 10 
STUDY 7: THE EFFECT OF PRIOR MOOD AND NFB ON NUMBER OF SPONTANEOUS PURCHASES 
 
9.3. Discussion 
 Study 7 aimed to investigate how people’s NFB levels are associated with their shopping 
behavior in a real-world setting.  I examined whether NFB would predict shoppers’ tendency to 
make unplanned, spontaneous purchases. Contrary to my expectation that individuals with higher 
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shoppers’ NFB levels interacted with their prior mood to predict shoppers’ purchases of 
spontaneous items. Specifically, low-NFB shoppers who entered the store with poorer mood 
purchased more items spontaneously, and this pattern was driven largely by their lower aversion 
to negative feelings.  
 Why might shoppers with low NFB make more spontaneous purchases than shoppers 
with high NFB? One possible reason is that high-NFB shoppers might have been avoiding such 
purchases to maintain a positive mood (preliminary correlational analyses showed a positive 
correlation between NFB and prior mood) or preempt potential feelings of guilt that are 
associated with impulse purchases, whereas low-NFB shoppers were less concerned about how 
spontaneous purchases might affect their subsequent mood. An interesting implication that 
follows from this explanation is that people with high NFB may avoid indulgent behaviors that 
provide immediate gratification but produce subsequent guilt or regret. Future research could 
examine how NFB affects the way people weigh short term versus long term happiness and 
satisfaction. Currently, it is also uncertain why shoppers with low NFB would make more 
spontaneous purchases when they experience poorer mood. Perhaps negative mood served as a 
signal of threat in the environment and therefore triggered spontaneous buying behavior in 
response to perceived threat.  
 The present study had some limitations. First, all the measures in the study were based on 
self-reports by participants. Hence, these measures were subject to biased reporting (e.g., 
shoppers may want to think of themselves as rational shoppers). Perhaps high-NFB participants 
were less likely to report making spontaneous purchases because they wanted to feel better about 
themselves. Although the term “spontaneous” was used in place of “impulse” in order to reduce 
any unpleasant connotation, they might have nonetheless perceived spontaneous purchases to be 
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vices. In addition, initial responses on the NFB might have affected participants’ responses on 
the classification task, and vice versa. Even though the order in which these tasks were 
administered was controlled for in the analyses, responses on the initial task might have 
nonetheless influenced responses on the subsequent task. Another limitation of the current study 
pertains to the specific context (i.e., supermarket) in which it was conducted. It is uncertain 





STUDY 8: USING NFB TO REVISIT THE EFFECTS OF MOOD ON 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL RECALL 
 Since the 1980s, researchers have been investigating how mood affects people’s retrieval 
of memories. One prominent finding by Bower (1981) is that following a mood induction, people 
tend to retrieve memories of similar valence to their induced mood state (e.g., a negative mood 
would lead to the retrieval of unpleasant memories; c.f. Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp 1978). 
Other researchers have also demonstrated trait-mood effects (e.g., people with depressive 
symptoms tend to report more unpleasant memories; Blaney 1986; Matt,Vasquez, and Campbell 
1992). Bower (1981) argued that this mood-congruency effect occurs because of our associative 
network of memories. At the time when people store their memories, they may experience 
certain positive or negative mood states. When a particular mood state becomes activated, it cues 
the retrieval of memories associated with that mood. Hence, during negative mood, unpleasant 
thoughts and memories come easily to mind, whereas during positive mood, pleasant thoughts 
and memories are more readily accessed.  
 There have been replications of the mood-congruency effect in people’s recall of past 
memories (e.g., Singer and Salovey 1988). However, some studies have uncovered the opposite 
effect: negative mood facilitates the retrieval of pleasant memories (e.g., Parrott & Sabini, 1990; 
Rusting, 1998). Parott and Sabini (1990) found that participants in a negative mood were more 
likely to recall positive memories (e.g., from the past week or from high school) than those in a 
positive mood. Researchers have proposed that this mood-incongruency effect emerges because 
people are motivated to regulate their negative moods by thinking of positive memories from 
their past (Isen 1985, 1987; Josephson, Singer, and Salovey 1996; Parott and Sabini 1990). Isen 
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(1985, 1987) also suggested that people attempt to maintain positive moods by thinking about 
pleasant events, that is, engage in behaviors that support mood maintenance.   
 To reconcile these contradictory findings, researchers have identified situational variables 
as well as individual differences known to influence people’s ability and/or motivation to engage 
in mood regulation that determine when mood-congruence or mood-incongruency effects arise. 
For instance, Rusting and DeHart (2000) demonstrated that participants instructed to engage in 
positive reappraisal of the induced negative mood were more likely than those instructed to focus 
continually on the induced negative mood and control participants to recall more pleasant 
memories. They also showed that this difference held up among participants with higher scores 
on the NMR (Catanzaro and Mearns, 1990; individuals who tend to expect that their efforts at 
negative mood regulation will be successful) but not those with lower scores on the NMR. Other 
work has shown that these effects are moderated by self-esteem (Smith and Petty 1995), 
tendency to repress versus acknowledge one’s mood (McFarland & Buehler 1997), dysphoria 
(Joorman and Siemer 2004), as well as instructions to engage in rumination (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema 1998). These findings suggest that NFB may also play a 
significant role in people’s retrieval of mood-congruent versus mood-incongruent memories.  
 To test whether the NFB scale would moderate the effect of mood on the valence of 
recalled memories, I ran a two-part study using participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In 
the first part, participants were asked to provide their responses to the NFB scale. In the second 
part, I ran a single-factor between-subjects experiment in which participants were induced with 
negative, neutral or positive mood. After this mood induction, they were instructed to recall 
memories from their childhood. I hypothesized that individuals with low NFB would be more 
likely to display the mood-congruency effect after a negative mood induction given their low 
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motivation to regulate their negative mood. That is, they would retrieve more unpleasant 
memories in a negative mood than a neutral mood. They may do so because of their associative 
network of memories or because they like to focus on and/or dwell in their negative mood states. 
On the other hand, individuals with high NFB would be more likely to display the mood-
incongruency effect in a negative mood. That is, they would retrieve more pleasant memories in 
a negative mood than a neutral mood to regulate their negative mood. It is less certain how NFB 
would affect people’s recall of memories in the positive mood condition. Low-NFB individuals 
may retrieve more pleasant memories following the positive (vs. neutral) mood condition if the 
associative network model applies to them. High-NFB individuals may also retrieve more 
pleasant memories if they are motivated to maintain their positive mood.  
10.1. Procedure 
 Eight hundred participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk filled out a qualification 
survey containing the NFB scale (α = .86) for 10-cents. Seven hundred and forty of them were 
contacted to participate in a follow-up survey; sixty of them failed the attention check question in 
the qualification survey and thus were not contacted for the follow-up study. Two hundred and 
fifty-six participants (139 female; mean age = 37) responded to the follow-up survey and were 
paid $1 for their participation.   
 In the follow-up survey, participants were randomly assigned to a negative (n = 88), 
neutral (n = 86) or positive (n = 82) mood condition. They were told that they would be 
participating in several unrelated studies on people’s imagination and memory. In the first 
section of the survey, participants completed the same mood manipulation task that was 
employed in the ad appeal validation study (study 5). Participants in the positive mood condition 
watched a scene from the motion picture When Harry Met Sally that has been used in previous 
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research to induce positive mood (Converse, Lin, Keysar, and Epley 2008). After this task, 
participants rated their current mood as a manipulation check on two 7-point bipolar scales 
where 1= unpleasant/bad mood and 7= pleasant/good mood. These scores were averaged to form 
a mood index (r = .96).  
 Next, participants proceeded to perform the autobiographical recall task. In particular, 
they were asked to recall five childhood (i.e., before age 15) events that happened to them, and to 
imagine that these events were happening to them at that moment. Participants briefly described 
each of these five memories, and then rated each of these memories on a 9-point scale where -4 = 
extremely unpleasant, 0 = neutral, +4 = extremely pleasant. After rating their memories, 
participants rated their current mood using the same scales for the manipulation check, how 
much they enjoyed the task on a 7-point scale where 1 = did not enjoy it at all and 7 = enjoyed it 
very much, and how involved they felt in performing the task on a 7-point scale where 1= felt 
very uninvolved and 7 = felt very involved. Finally, they filled out the Ten Item Personality 
Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003), a brief measure of the Big Five 
personality traits, a question on whether they had a history of clinical depression, as well as some 
demographic questions. The Big Five and depression questions were included because previous 
research has shown that neuroticism and depression may influence mood congruency effects in 
autobiographical recall tasks (Bradley, Mogg, Galbraith, and Perrett 1993; Joormann and Siemer 
2004; Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, and Nolen-Hoeksema 1998).  
10.2. Results  
10.2.1. Manipulation Check 
 Seventeen participants failed the attention check and were thus removed from the sample. 
Responses on the mood manipulation check questions was submitted to a multiple linear 
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regression with two mood condition contrast codes (contrast 1 is coded such that negative mood 
= -2, neutral mood = 1, and positive mood = 1; contrast 2 is coded such that negative mood = 0, 
neutral mood = -1, and positive mood = 1), mean-centered NFB scores from the qualification 
survey, and the two interaction terms between each contrast code and mean-centered NFB scores 
as predictors. There was a significant main effect of contrast 1 such that participants in the 
negative mood condition experienced more unpleasant and bad mood (M = 4.15) compared to 
the participants in both the neutral mood condition and the positive mood condition (M =5.93, β 
= .65, t(224) = 11.56, p < .001). However, the main effect of contrast 2 was not significant (β = -
.04, t(224) = -.43, p = .665); in other words there was no significant difference in mood between 
the neutral and positive mood conditions, suggesting that the positive mood manipulation was 
ineffective in lifting one’s mood. Both of the interaction terms were not significant.  
10.2.2. Valence of Memories Recalled 
 In line with procedures employed by Rusting and DeHart (2000), participants’ ratings for 
each memory were averaged to form an overall negativity-positivity index for the memories. A 
one-way ANOVA performed on this index revealed a non-significant difference in valence of 
memories across the three mood conditions (F(2, 236) = 1.12, p = .329). A subsequent contrast 
analysis (negative mood = -2, neutral mood = 1, and positive mood = 1) indicated a directionally 
consistent but non-significant mood congruency effect whereby participants in the negative 
mood condition tended to recall less positive valence memories compared to those in the neutral 
and positive mood conditions (t(236) = 1.27, p = .206).  
 To test the hypothesis that high-NFB (low-NFB) individuals would be more likely to 
exhibit the mood incongruency (congruency) effect, index scores were submitted to a multiple 
linear regression with two mood condition contrast codes (contrast 1 is coded such that negative 
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mood = -2, neutral mood = 1, and positive mood = 1; contrast 2 is coded such that negative mood 
= 0, neutral mood = -1, and positive mood = 1), mean-centered NFB scores from the 
qualification survey, and the two interaction terms between each contrast code and mean-
centered NFB scores as predictors. A marginally significant effect of contrast 1 emerged (β = 
.15, t(224) = 1.84, p = .067) whereby participants in the negative mood condition tended to recall 
more negative memories than those in the neutral and positive mood conditions. There was also a 
non-significant interaction effect between contrast 1 and NFB (β = -.17, t(224) = -1.38, p = .169), 
which remained non-significant but became stronger after controlling for depression and 
neuroticism (β = -.19, t(221) = -1.54, p = .126; see figure 11).  
FIGURE 11 




To examine the pattern of this interaction, a spotlight analysis was conducted at +1 SD above the 
sample mean and -1 SD below the sample mean with depression and neuroticism as covariates. 
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effect of contrast 1 on valence of recalled memories (β = 01, t(221) = .05, p = .957). However, 
among participants with low NFB (-1 SD below the sample mean), those induced with negative 
mood recalled more negative memories than those induced with neutral mood and positive mood 
(β = .26, t(118) = 2.10, p = .037). These findings partially support my hypothesis. Although 
high-NFB individuals were not more likely to recall mood incongruent memories, low-NFB 
individuals were more likely to recall mood congruent memories.   
10.2.3. Experience of the Recall Task 
 To examine whether the mood induction and NFB had an effect on participants’ 
experience of the recall task, participants’ enjoyment of the task was regressed on the same 
predictors and covariates in the same multiple linear regression analysis that was conducted for 
valence of memories recalled. A significant main effect of contrast 1 emerged (β = .20, t(221) = 
2.33, p = .021) whereby participants in the negative mood condition enjoyed the task less than 
those in the neutral and positive mood conditions. However, this main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between contrast 1 and mean centered NFB scores (β = -.27, t(221) = -
2.18, p = .03; see figure 11, upper panel). Among participants with high NFB, there was no 
significant main effect of contrast 1 (β = .02, t(221) = .14, p = .888). Among participants with 
low NFB, those in the negative mood condition enjoyed the task less than those in the neutral 
mood and positive mood conditions (β = .38, t(221) = 3.05, p = .003). I conducted the same 
multiple regression analysis on participants’ mood after completing the recall task. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of contrast 1 such that participants in the negative mood 
condition experienced more unpleasant and bad mood than those in the other two conditions (β = 
.29, t(221) = 4.30, p < .001). There was also a significant main effect of NFB such that 
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mood condition experienced more unpleasant and bad mood after the recall task than those in the 
neutral mood and positive mood conditions (β = .46, t(221) = 4.63, p < .001).4
10.3. Discussion 
 
 The current study was aimed at testing whether NFB would moderate mood state 
dependent memory recall. I hypothesized that after a negative (vs. neutral) mood induction, low-
NFB participants would be more likely to retrieve mood-congruent memories but high-NFB 
would be more likely to retrieve mood-incongruent memories. Results partially supported my 
hypothesis. Among low-NFB participants, those induced with negative mood recalled less 
pleasant memories than those induced with neutral and positive mood. However, among high-
NFB participants, there was no difference in valence of memories across the mood conditions. 
Because the positive mood manipulation was unsuccessful, conclusions regarding how NFB 
influences people’s recall of memories in a positive mood cannot be made.  
 It is plausible that low-NFB participants retrieved more unpleasant memories in a 
negative mood state because of their associative memories or simply because of their low 
motivation to engage in mood repair (i.e., they prefer to perpetuate their negative feelings). The 
latter explanation is consistent with past research indicating that people with a propensity to 
focus repeatedly on their distress (i.e., individuals with a ruminative orientation; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) tend to display more mood-congruent cognitions (McFarland and Buehler 
1998). Nonetheless, the current data do not allow me to tease apart these two explanations. 
                                                          
4 Regressing participants’ involvement scores on the same set of variables led to a marginally significant main effect 
of NFB such that higher NFB scores were associated with greater involvement in the recall task (β = .24, t(221) = 
1.90, p = .059). Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between contrast 1 
and NFB (β = -.16, t(221) = -1.83, p = .068). Among high-NFB participants, there was a directional but non-
significant effect of contrast 1such that those in the negative mood condition were more involved than those in the 
neutral mood and positive mood conditions (β = -.12, t(221) = -1.56, p = .119). Among the low-NFB participants, 
the same contrast was not significant (β = .09, t(221) = 1.03, p = .303). 
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 Although high-NFB participants were not more likely to engage in mood-incongruent 
recall, they did recall more positive memories compared to low-NFB participants. It is possible 
that high-NFB participants were trying to override the accessibility of negative memories as seen 
in their greater involvement in the autobiographical recall task (refer to footnote 3). Furthermore, 
they may not have perceived retrieval of positive memories to be a dominant mood repair 
strategy. Perhaps making the choice to recall pleasant versus unpleasant memories more salient 
to high-NFB participants could have increased their use of this strategy. Consequently, high-
NFB participants in the current study did experience greater enjoyment and positive feelings 
following the recall task relative to low-NFB participants, suggesting that they might have 
engaged in some mood repair. 
 One obvious limitation of the current study is the ineffectiveness of the positive mood 
manipulation. As a result, I was unable to test the mood-congruency hypothesis and the mood 
maintenance hypothesis with respect to positive mood. Another limitation of this study is the use 
of self-report measures, in particular, participants’ valence ratings of their memories. Such 
ratings may be subject to response biases like self presentation concerns. Future studies should 
employ other means that are less susceptible to these biases (e.g., memory latency measure; 
Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema 2010) to test the hypotheses. Future research could also investigate 
how NFB may moderate mood congruency and mood incongruency effects in a variety of 
cognitive operations including selective attention and self-perception (e.g., Bower 1981; 
McFarland and Buehler 2012). It would also be interesting to test whether these cognitive 
processes of mood repair operate automatically or under strategic control.  
 Past research has yielded contradictory findings with respect to the effect of mood on 
autobiographical recall, with some studies showing stronger mood-congruency effects and others 
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documenting stronger mood-incongruency effects. This had led researchers to identify 
moderators that determine the relative strength of these two types of phenomena. The current 
study contributes to this research by investigating another possible moderator of these effects, 
NFB. Findings from the current study suggest that individuals with low NFB experiencing 
negative moods may perpetuate or exacerbate these feelings by thinking about unpleasant 
thoughts and memories. Individuals with high NFB on the other hand seem to be less susceptible 







 In this dissertation, I provided empirical evidence for the construct, the “Need to Feel 
Better.” This construct challenges the assumption that people have a universal tendency to want 
to feel better and that people necessarily attempt to repair their mood when they feel bad. I 
propose that people differ in the way they need to feel better in four ways: their general tendency 
to engage in mood repair behaviors, the aversion they have toward negative feelings, the pleasure 
they gain from these feelings, and their inclination to reflect on these feelings as opposed to 
doing something to feel better. To this end, I constructed a scale that captures these differences, 
and demonstrated that it possesses a clear and stable factor structure, good construct validity, and 
acceptable test-retest reliability (study 1, Chapter 3). Using the scale I developed, I found that 
NFB is related to various affective and self-regulation constructs, personality and lifestyle 
variables, parental upbringing, cultural and national identity, values, and psychological well-
being (studies 2-4, Chapters 4-6). Furthermore, as shown in studies 3 and 4 (Chapters 5 and 6), 
scores on the NFB scale predict people’s tendency to engage in mood repair when they 
experience negative mood. Specifically, people with high NFB are more likely to consume 
positive media content when they are in a bad (vs. neutral) mood, whereas people with low NFB 
do not exhibit the same tendency. Importantly, the NFB scale appeared to have better predictive 
ability compared to existing mood repair scales (i.e., TMMS mood repair subscale and the 
NMR). In addition, I obtained preliminary evidence that the NFB predicts people’s preferences 
for products that are marketed using advertising appeals that emphasize the attainment of 
happiness independent of their existing mood states (see study 5, Chapter 7). To investigate 
whether NFB predicts mood repair via consumption behaviors, I tested whether people with 
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higher NFB would be more likely to consume indulgent snacks under a negative mood (study 6, 
Chapter 8) and make more spontaneous purchases at a supermarket (study 7, Chapter 9). 
Although I did not obtain support for these hypotheses, the results that emerged provide new 
theoretical perspectives concerning consumption under negative mood states. For example, in 
study 6, participants who tend to derive more pleasure from negative feelings were more likely to 
indulge in unhealthy snacks when they were induced with negative mood, suggesting the 
possibility that these individuals were motivated to consume more snacks for reasons other than 
mood repair. Finally, using the NFB scale, I revisited the effect of mood on autobiographical 
recall and found that NFB predicts the extent to which people recall unpleasant memories when 
they experience negative mood (study 8, chapter 10). Specifically, people with low NFB 
appeared to be more susceptible to the mood-congruency effect in the context of 
autobiographical recall.  
 
11.1. Contributions of the Current Research 
11.1.1. Contribution to Theory Development  
 The development of our construct may help to account for inconsistent findings in the 
mood repair literature. Although earlier studies have provided evidence that people tend to 
engage in mood repair when they experience negative mood, recent studies have not been able to 
replicate this finding or find it to be less robust than previously thought. There is an emerging 
consensus that mood repair occurs only when certain conditions are present (e.g., individuals 
must view mood as dynamic; Andrade 2005). My findings suggest that people must possess 
sufficient motivation to feel better in order for them to engage in mood repair, and extends 
current understanding of why individuals are not motivated to terminate their negative mood and 
continue to remain in it. For example, individuals who do not find negative feelings aversive are 
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less motivated to regulate these feelings. The development of the NFB scale could also allow us 
to tease apart mood-congruency and mood-incongruency effects in the literature. For example, in 
study 8 (chapter 10), I found that participants with low but not high NFB were susceptible to the 
mood-congruency effect (low-NFB participants were more likely to recall unpleasant memories 
in a negative versus neutral mood).  
 My dissertation also highlights significant limitations of treating consumption under 
negative mood as a surrogate for mood repair. As shown in studies 6 and 7 (Chapters 8 and 9), it 
is not always the case that people consume more when they experience negative mood states, and 
even if they do, the consumption of pleasure or heightened consumption in general may be 
motivated by reasons other than mood repair. Furthermore, people may perceive consumption 
behaviors as a temporary fix with undesirable ramifications in the long run, and therefore choose 
to avoid these behaviors to preempt subsequent negative feelings (see study 7, section 9.3). The 
NFB construct enables us to determine whether people’s behaviors under negative moods are 
indeed driven by hedonic motives to repair mood.  
 
11.1.2. Contribution to Managerial and Consumer Welfare Implications 
 The NFB scale allows us to identify people who differ in their motivation to feel better, 
and to understand the profile of these different groups of individuals. In my dissertation, I found 
that certain demographic groups (e.g., female consumers, elderly people) tend to have higher 
NFB (study 2, chapter 4). NFB is also associated with a variety of cultural, personality and 
lifestyle variables. For example, individuals who identify strongly with individualistic cultures 
(people with strong American identities), were raised by affectionate parents, and espouse more 
traditional and religious values tend to have higher NFB (studies 2-4, Chapters 4-6). Having a 
broader understanding of consumer segments with both high and low NFB levels would enable 
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marketers to be more effective in their targeting strategies for “feel-good” products and mood-
lifting advertisement appeals. As suggested by preliminary evidence from study 5 (Chapter 7), 
marketers could target appeals that emphasize happiness at segments that possess higher NFB. 
Additionally, understanding the psychological profiles of high- and low-NFB consumers could 
allow marketers to create fit between NFB and the type of products or offerings that would 
appeal to them. For example, products related to certain individual differences associated with 
NFB (e.g., promotion focus, conscientiousness) could be marketed to high-NFB consumers using 
mood-lifting advertisement appeals. The NFB scale would therefore be beneficial in helping 
marketers develop and test practical suggestions for implementing segmentation.  
 Findings from studies 6 and 7 suggest that people may consume more unhealthy snacks 
and make more spontaneous purchases when they experience negative mood because of their 
tendency to dwell and reflect on their negative feelings and their intolerance of negative feelings. 
Exploring interventions that limit these practices is imperative when engaging in these behaviors 
becomes detrimental for consumers (e.g., overeating, spending impulsively, etc.). Interventions 
that prevent consumers from ruminating and wallowing in their negative moods may help 
prevent binge-eating of unhealthy foods. In addition, interventions that manipulate consumers’ 
aversion toward negative feelings (e.g., heightening the salience of potential guilt and pain from 
overspending) may be useful in curbing impulse purchasing. Consequently, designing 
interventions based on each facet of NFB could help decrease or even increase people’s 
engagement in various consumption behaviors (e.g., increasing consumers’ mood repair 
tendencies could encourage them to shop more). Furthermore, given evidence that people with 
high NFB tend to experience greater positive affect and subjective well-being, interventions that 
motivate low-NFB individuals to repair their mood may increase their life satisfaction. In 
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addition, tendency to derive pleasure from negative feelings and tendency to reflect on negative 
feelings emerged as significant predictors of depression, anxiety and stress symptoms (study 2, 
section 4.4). Hence, further investigation of these relationships may illuminate the etiology of 
mood and anxiety disorders and lead to the development of effective treatments.  
 
11.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 There are several limitations pertaining to the NFB construct. First, NFB has been tested 
mainly as a trait as opposed to a state. In future research, I aim to design interventions specific to 
each facet of NFB, and examine whether these interventions would manipulate people’s desire to 
feel better and hence engage in mood repair activities.  
 Second, in my dissertation, I defined feeling “better” as a general positive affective state 
and tested how individuals with high NFB react towards a general negative mood state. It 
remains uncertain whether NFB would generalize to the regulation of content-specific emotions 
such as anxiety and anger. A future research direction would be to test whether NFB applies to 
general moods, to specific emotional states, or both. To the extent that it generalizes to specific 
emotional states, interventions can be targeted at high-NFB consumers who experience specific 
emotions (e.g., policies for compensating angry customers from high-NFB segments). 
Additionally, I did not distinguish between feeling better in the moment (e.g., pleasure from 
enjoyable activities) versus a meta-level of feeling better (e.g., feeling effective from exerting 
control). The latter refers to motivational states that upon fulfillment may lead to a positive state 
of satisfaction. Future research should examine whether NFB extends to specific emotional and 
motivational states. Related to this, it would be interesting to test whether different mood repair 
strategies have different properties—for example, consuming high-caloric foods might bring 
forth immediate visceral pleasure, whereas listening to happy music may require more cognitive 
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participation for pleasure to be derived from—and whether high-NFB individuals would be 
sensitive to these differences. It would also be interesting to investigate how NFB is related to 
different kinds of happiness defined in the literature (e.g., hedonic wellbeing which consists of 
happiness from instant gratification vs. eudaimonic wellbeing which consists of happiness that 
comes from working toward greater good; Ryan and Deci 2001). 
 Third, the NFB scale does not encompass individuals’ strategic attempts to remain in a 
negative mood. For example, people may choose to be angry to perform better in confrontations 
(Tamir and Ford 2012). Also, the NFB scale does not include people’s attempts to counteract 
distressful negative states with less distressful negative states in order to feel better. For example, 
people may engage in defensive pessimistic thinking in relation to an uncertain outcome to 
reduce their levels of anxiety (Norem and Cantor 1986), or they may combat fear and uncertainty 
about their future with anger (e.g., the Occupy Wall Street protests).  
 Several unexpected findings in the current dissertation warrant further investigation. 
First, contrary to my prediction that high-NFB participants would consume more unhealthy 
snacks under a negative mood, I found that participants with a greater chronic tendency to derive 
more pleasure and reflect on negative feelings (which would lead to lower levels of NFB) ate 
more snacks when they were induced with a negative mood (see Chapter 8). Second, I obtained a 
significant negative association between NFB and number of spontaneous purchases, which was 
the direct opposite of my initial hypothesis (see Chapter 9). It is uncertain whether individuals 
who engaged in greater consumption or buying behavior in these studies were doing so to 
strategically repair their moods. In other words, they might have been motivated by other 
conscious or unconscious goals. Possible explanations for these results (e.g., intentional 
prolonging of negative affect such as guilt from consuming unhealthy snacks) have been raised 
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in sections 8.3 and 9.3. In future research, I plan to replicate these findings and test these 
alternative accounts. I would also like to introduce interventions that are related to particular 
mental models or lay beliefs (e.g., consuming certain foods can boost one’s levels of endorphins 
and increase happiness), and test whether these interventions would interact with NFB to 
determine consumption behavior.  
 In future research, I would also like to investigate whether high-NFB individuals would 
engage in preemptive mood repair strategies in response to anticipated future mood-states. For 
instance, would a sales representative with high NFB be more likely to schedule a vacation after 
a busy peak sales period? In addition, I would like to attain greater understanding regarding the 
antecedents of NFB. Preliminary findings from my dissertation suggest that culture and 
parenting are factors that may contribute to one’s NFB. I would like to explore these factors in 
greater depth (e.g., how NFB differs across countries) and uncover other possible antecedents in 
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ORIGINAL SCALE ITEMS IN ITEM GENERATION PROCESS 
Initial Pool of 79 Items 
When I feel upset, I usually find a way to cheer myself up.a 
When I feel upset, I immediately do something to feel better.* 
When I feel upset, I often wallow in it.  
When I feel upset, I make myself feel better by treating myself to something I like.a 
When I feel upset, I just allow myself to feel depressed. 
When I feel upset, I’ll be upset for a long time. a 
I tend to dwell on my negative feelings.a 
I always give in to my negative emotions. 
I try not to give in to my negative emotions.a 
When I experience negative mood, I don’t try to change this mood.a 
When I experience negative mood, I allow myself to experience this mood.a 
It’s okay to feel negative emotions at times.* 
I can tolerate being upset.* 
There is nothing wrong with feeling very emotional.a 
I find pleasure in sadness.a 
I dislike how it feels when I am sad.* 
I dislike how it feels when I am angry.a 
I really like feeling happy.* 
I like how it feels when I am furious.* 
I like thinking about sad things.* 
I’ll do anything to stop feeling distressed or upset.* 
When I feel distressed or upset, I must do something about it immediately.* 
I shouldn’t feel negative emotions.* 
There’s no need to change negative emotions.* 
There’s nothing wrong with feeling negative emotions.* 
 I know feeling negative emotions is wrong.a 
When I experience negative mood, I wouldn’t want to change this mood.a 
When I experience negative mood, I don’t try to change it because I believe it is important to experience.a 
When I experience negative mood, I don’t need to feel better.a 
I don’t need to feel happy all the time.* 
It is fine to be in a negative mood.a 
I enjoy the occasional negative mood states. 
Experiencing negative mood is not threatening to me.* 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because it makes it easier to be around people.a 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because it makes me personable.a 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because I want to get things done.a 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because I want to be productive.a 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because I want to feel good. 
I try to make myself feel better when I’m upset because I hate experiencing negative mood.a 
My feelings of distress or being upset are not acceptable.a 
Feeling distressed or upset is unbearable to me.* 
I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed or upset. 
There’s nothing worse than feeling distressed or upset. 
When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way. 
When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way. 
There is no need to make myself feel better because negative moods are fleeting and transient.a 
There is no need to make myself feel better because I can tolerate negative moods.a 
Resisting positive feelings helps me think more realistically. 
Being in a positive mood is distracting. 
Sometimes I inhibit my positive feelings to motivate myself to work hard. 
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Sometimes I inhibit my positive feelings to protect myself from future disappointment. 
Sometimes I inhibit my positive feelings to be respectful or considerate of others. 
Excessive happiness could cause bad fortune. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't deserve to be in a good mood.a 
Denying myself of positive feelings can strengthen my character. 
Good moods are trivial and insignificant.* 
Staying in a negative mood helps me be more focused.a 
Being in a negative mood helps me think more analytically. 
Sometimes I maintain my negative feelings to motivate myself to work hard. 
Sometimes I maintain my negative feelings to atone for my guilt. 
Sometimes I maintain my negative feelings to punish myself.* 
Sometimes I maintain my negative feelings to empathize with others. 
Staying in a negative mood helps me feel confident of handling the worse when it comes. 
Staying in a negative mood helps me signal to others my need for social support.* 
I sometimes think that worrying makes unfortunate events less likely. 
I sometimes become angry so as to avoid feeling sad.* 
I sometimes stay in a negative mood to prove a point to others.* 
I sometimes stay angry to protest others' treatment toward me. 
I sometimes stay in a negative mood to punish others for treating me badly. 
I sometimes stay in a negative mood to show my displeasure with the state of matters.a 
It bothers me when people tell me to cheer up when I am feeling upset.* 
When I experience negative mood, I don’t try to make myself feel better because I distrust such positive feelings.a 
When I’m feeling upset, it’s more important to resolve my negative mood than find something to make me feel 
happy.a 
 
* Items from the initial pool of 79 items that were kept in the reduced set of 49 items 
a  Items from the initial pool of 79 items that were modified and included in the reduced set of 49 items 
 
 
Frequency Scale Items from Reduced Set of 49 Items 
When I’m feeling upset, I like to dwell in it. 
When I’m feeling upset, I don’t try to change it. 
When I’m feeling upset, I allow myself to experience it. 
When I’m feeling upset, I wouldn’t want to change this mood. 
When I’m feeling upset, I don’t try to change it because I don't deserve to feel better. 
I can tolerate being upset. 
I like how it feels when I am furious. 
I like thinking about sad things. 
When I’m feeling upset, I immediately do something to feel better. 
When I’m feeling upset, I look for ways to cheer myself up. 
When I’m feeling upset, I feel the need to make myself feel better. 
When I feel distressed or upset, I must do something about it immediately. 
When I’m feeling upset, I need to do nice things for myself to improve my mood. 
I really like feeling happy. 
When I am in negative mood I try to make myself feel better because it makes me personable. 
I dislike how it feels when I am sad. 
Experiencing negative feelings bothers me. 
Experiencing negative feelings threatens me. 
When I’m in a negative mood, I try to make myself feel better because I want to get things done. 
 
Agreement Scale Items from Reduced Set of 49 Items 
Staying in a negative mood is not good for me. 
One should not allow negative feelings to last too long. 
I shouldn’t feel negative emotions. 
Feeling distressed or upset is unbearable to me. 
Negative emotions are not acceptable to me. 
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I’ll do anything to stop feeling distressed or upset. 
When I’m feeling upset, I need to do positive things to cheer myself up. 
If I’m in a bad mood, I try to make myself feel better because it makes it easier to be around people. 
If I’m in a bad mood, I try to make myself feel better because I want to be productive. 
I prefer to dwell on my negative feelings rather than to make myself feel better. 
There’s nothing wrong with feeling negative emotions. 
It’s okay to feel negative emotions at times 
Sometimes I enjoy feeling bad. 
Sometimes I find a little pleasure in being angry. 
Sometimes I maintain my negative feelings to punish myself. 
I sometimes become angry so as to avoid feeling sad. 
I sometimes stay in a negative mood to prove a point to others. 
I sometimes stay in a negative mood to show my displeasure with the situation. 
It bothers me when people tell me to cheer up when I am feeling upset. 
When I’m feeling upset, I don’t need to feel better. 
There’s no need to change negative emotions. 
Trying to make myself feel better when I’m feeling upset is unnatural. 
When I’m feeling upset, I wouldn’t feel right trying to make myself feel happy. 
There is no need to make oneself feel better because negative moods do not last very long. 
There usually is no need for me to make myself feel better because I can handle negative feelings. 
Staying in a negative mood helps me focus and think more clearly. 
Staying in a negative mood helps me signal to others my need for support. 
I don’t need to feel happy all the time. 
Good moods are trivial and insignificant. 
























Chi-square badness-of-fit 114.5581 111.5892 97.1499 1082.9045 
Chi-square degrees of freedom 100 98 102 104 
Probability > Chi-square .1515 .1645 .6172 <.0001 
Goodness-of-Fit Index .9018 .9029 .8906 .3298 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index .8664 .8652 .8541 .2633 
RMSEA Estimate .0350 .0341 .0000 .2812 
Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index .9902 .9909 1.0000 .3427 









POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VALUES ITEMS FROM STUDY 4 
 
 Factor and Reliability 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 α = .84 α = .80 α = .85 α = .77 α = .49 r = -.31 α = .51 α = .36 - 
Using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism around the 
world. 
.79  .061 .082 -.126 -.073 -.066 .025 .0 
The best way to ensure peace is through military strength. .71  .077 .033 -.114 .059 -.208 .111 .0 
The U.S. stands above all other countries in the world. .61  125 350 .023 4 . . 00 
The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional 
American customs and values. 
.56  -.072 .184 -.095 .280 .125 .237 36 
Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and 
health care. 
.54  -.007 .206 -.234 .335 .316 .234 8 
I often feel proud to be American. .53  .244 .500 .050 -.190 .012 -.037 86 
I am worried that there will soon be another terrorist attack in the United States. .51  .087 .097 .285 .274 -.116 .200 82 
Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents.*   -.44  .292 -.144 .346 -.333 -.244 -.060 .2 
Religion is a very important part of my life  .78 .144 .118 -.046 -.088 -.005 .001 .0 
Homosexuality should be accepted by society.*    -.76 -.026 -.129 .230 -.136 .019 .082 .0 
Society is better off if people make marriage and having children a priority.  .69 .072 .125 .051 .125 -.109 .148 .0 
The use of marijuana should be made legal.*    -.63 .088 -.089 .121 -.009 .126 .029 .0 
The government should do more to protect morality in society.  .53 -.143 .096 .310 -.156 .078 -.006 85 
Children are better off when a parent stays home to focus on the family.  .42 -.072 .143 .276 .328 -.095 -.047 4 
I follow closely news about candidates and election campaign in political elections.   .89 -.073 -.037 .006 .016 .049 . 
I follow closely what's going on with the government and public affairs.  -.021 .89 -.068 .009 .007 .124 -.019 .0 
I enjoy talking about government and politics with friends and family.  .094 .81 -.068 -.049 .026 -.182 .008 .0 
I am enthusiastic about voting in the upcoming elections.  .023 .68 .121 .158 -.250 -.168 -.017 -4 
Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people*  -.177 .074   -.81 .052 .124 .028 .082 .6 
Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard.  .149 -.026 .71 .227 -.117 .002 .049 .3 
The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going 
deeper into debt.* 
 -.070 .134   -.62 .301 -.346 .042 -.130 5 
The economic system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests.*  -.275 .064   -.46 .388 .160 .349 -.171 . 
Government aid to the poor does more harm than good, by making people too 
dependent on government assistance. 
 .193 -.056 .45 -.146 .302 .013 .429 .0 
This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment.  -.264 .090 -.116 .70 -.074 -.069 -.063 5 
People in this country should learn to live with less.  .083 -.093 .005 .63 -.037 .268 .007  





APPENDIX C (CONTINUED) 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL VALUES ITEMS FROM STUDY 4 
 
 Factor and Reliability 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 α = .84 α = .80 α = .85 α = .77 α = .49 r = -.31 α = .51 α = .36 - 
Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient.  .124 -.007 -.113 .027 .74 .051 .095 . 
Most elected officials care what people like me think.*  .109 .134 .183 .100    -.56 -.335 .351 . 
We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here 
at home. 
 -.096 -.137 .039 .027 .069 .78 .060 -2 
U.S. efforts to solve problems around the world usually end up making things worse.  .086 -.085 -.197 .100 .185 .51 .377 . 
Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies.  -.239 .077 -.379 .268 .024 .49 -.307 -2 
I am sometimes uncomfortable being around people not of my race.  .017 .022 -.125 -.119 .076 .106 .72 10 
I couldn’t vacation without my smart phone  -.081 .038 .169 .075 -.062 -.030 .55 86 
Americans need to be willing to give up privacy and freedom in order to be safe from 
terrorism. 
 .133 -.041 -.059 .290 -.329 -.148 .35 88 
The police should not be able to search people just because they think they look 
suspicious. 
 -.137 .006 -.074 -.028 .106 -.030 -.167 .79 







ADVERTISEMENTS FROM STUDY 5 (TOP IMAGE: MOOD LIFTING APPEAL ABSENT 
CONDITION; BOTTOM IMAGE: MOOD LIFTING APPEAL PRESENT CONDITION) 
 
 
 
